Re: Justifying the Theory of Everything

From: George Levy <>
Date: Sat, 30 Jun 2007 20:51:00 -0700

Hi Jason

I have not contributed to the list for a while but your question
interests me.
I do not accept as primitive an independent mathematicalism/arithmetical
realism. I think that math and logic are co-emergent with the
consciousness of the observer. In addition physics is also co-emergent
with the observer. So in a sense the "I" or first person is
primitive-emergent. "I", math and physics are all anthropically linked.

The information of the plenitude being zero is the simplest case that
requires the least explanation. Any other information content would have
to be justified, and that would force us an endless causal chain. Now
let me qualify that the "perceived" information of the plenitude is
definitely not zero because it is contingent on the observer. Here the
causal chain can begin at the observer.

The simplest theory of everyting is that everything exists. But this is
hardly satisfying. A useful theory of everything should bring in the
observer as a boundary condition. The theory, more precisely, which
physical model is "true," may be indeterminate. This indeterminacy would
be analogous to quantum indeterminacy applied to the cosmic scale. This
would correspond to the "I" being equally "at home" in multiple
different worlds or equivalently that multiple worlds would be in a
superposition with respect to the "I."


Jason wrote:

>I have seen two main justifications on this list for the everything
>ensemble, the first comes from information theory which says the
>information content of everything is zero (or close to zero). The
>other is mathematicalism/arithmatical realism which suggests
>mathematical truth exists independandly of everything else and is the
>basis for everything.
>My question to the everything list is: which explaination do you
>prefer and why? Are these two accounts compatible, incompatible, or
>complimentary? Additionally, if you subscribe to or know of other
>justifications I would be interesting in hearing it.

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Received on Sat Jun 30 2007 - 23:51:13 PDT

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