Correction, Read This Instead

From: Fritz Griffith <>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 1999 18:38:05 MST

I made some mistakes in my last post.

  Hi, I'm new to this mailing list. I have a question regarding Everett's
MWI. How and why is there a more likely probability of certain states than
others? Everette proved that the same probability laws exist in every
world. I have read that some states are more likely to be our world because
there are more worlds corresponding to that state than other states.
Normally, I would assume that the probability laws describe how many worlds
there are corresponding to a given state, but as far as I understand it, any
two different worlds existing in exactly the same state is strictly
forbidden. Considering that every possible state does exist in some world,
it seems safe for me to conclude that there is only one world corresponding
to every state, and the chance of finding ourselves in any possible universe
is just as likely as any other. The result would be total chaos. It is
obvious that this is not the situation.
  The only possible explanation I can think of is that the probability laws
don't describe how many worlds of a given state exist, but rather directly
describe the actual likelihood of a given world being ours. But this
description doesn't make sense either, because for every split in which we
are favored to follow a certain world, there exists another world of equally
real people who assumed they would they would follow the same path, who
instead ended up in the so-called unlikely world. Because the people in
both worlds are equally real, there is no way to say that we are more likely
to follow either path; rather, between this single-split example, the chance
would be 50/50 as to which world we would end up in. Considering all
possible worlds, we are back to the drawing board - the chance of us
actually being in a world that isn't chaotic is pretty much nonexistant.
  So, how does the MWI explain the stability of our world?

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Received on Wed Nov 10 1999 - 17:51:17 PST

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