Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

From: Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Thu, 28 Jun 2007 15:56:20 +0200

David,


Le 17-juin-07, à 18:28, David Nyman a écrit :

> IMHO this semantic model gives you a knock-down argument against
> 'computationalism', *unless* one identifies (I'm hoping to hear from
> Bruno on this) the 'primitive' entities and operators with those of
> the number realm - i.e. you make numbers and their relationships the
> 'primitive base'. But crucially, you must still take these entities
> and their relationships to be the *real* basis of personal-world
> 'grasp'. If you continue to adopt a 'somethingist' view, then no
> 'program' (i.e. one of the arbitrarily large set that could be imputed
> to any 'something') could coherently be responsible for its personal-
> world grasp (such as it may be). This is the substance of the UDA
> argument. All personal-worlds must emerge internally via recursive
> levels of relationship inherited from primitive grasp: in a
> 'somethingist' view, such grasp must reside with a primitive
> 'something', as we have seen, and in a computationalist view, it must
> reside in the number realm. But the fundamental insight applies.



I agree completely, but I am not yet convinced that you appreciate my
methodological way of proceeding. I have to ask you questions, but I
see you have been prolific during the Siena congress, which is not
gentle for my mailbox :). Anyway I will take some time to read yours'
and the others' posts before asking for questions that others have
perhaps asked and that you have perhaps already answered.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Received on Thu Jun 28 2007 - 09:56:31 PDT

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