David Nyman wrote:
> On 23/06/07, *Russell Standish* <lists.domain.name.hidden
> <mailto:lists.domain.name.hidden>> wrote:
>
> RS: Perhaps you are one of those rare souls with a foot in
> each camp. That could be be very productive!
>
> I hope so! Let's see...
>
> RS: This last post is perfectly lucid to me.
>
> Phew!! Well, that's a good start.
>
> RS: I hope I've answered it
> adequately.
>
> Your answer is very interesting - not quite what I expected:
>
> RS: In some Platonic sense, all possible observers are already
> out there, but by physically instantiating it in our world, we are in
> effect opening up a communication channel between ourselves and the
> new consciousness.
>
> I think I must be missing something profound in your intended meanings of:
>
> 1) 'out there'
> 2) 'physically instantiating'
> 3) 'our world'
>
> My current 'picture' of it is as follows. The 'Platonic sense' I assume
> equates to the 'bit-string plenitude' (which is differentiable from 'no
> information' only by internal observers, like the Library of Babel - a
> beautiful idea BTW). But I'm assuming a 'hierarchy' of recursive
> computational emergence through bits up through, say, strings, quarks,
> atoms, molecules, etc - in other words what is perceived as
> matter-energy by observers. I then assume that both 'physical objects'
> and any correlated observers emerge from this matter-energy level, and
> that this co-emergence accomplishes the 'physical instantiation'. IOW,
> the observer is the 1-person view, and the physical behaviour the
> 3-person view, of the same underlying complex emergent - they're
> different descriptions of the same events.
>
> If this is so, then as you say, the opening of the 'communication
> channel' would be a matter of establishing the means and modes of
> interaction with any new consciousness, because the same seamless
> underlying causal sequence unites observer-world and physical-world:
> again, different descriptions, same events.
>
> If the above is accepted (but I'm beginning to suspect there's something
> deeply wrong with it), then the 'stability' of the world of the observer
> should equate to the 'stability' of the physical events to which it is
> linked through *identity*. Now here's what puzzles me. ISTM that the
> imputation of 'computation' to the physical computer is only through the
> systematic correspondence of certain stable aspects of its (principally)
> electronic behaviour to computational elements: numbers,
> mathematical-logical operators, etc. The problem is in the terms
> 'imputation' and 'correspondence': this is surely merely a *way of
> speaking* about the physical events in the computer, an arbitrary
> ascription, from an infinite possible set, of externally-established
> semantics to the intrinsic physical syntactics.
>
> Consequently, ISTM that the emergence of observer-worlds has to be
> correlated (somehow) - one-to-one, or isomorphically - with
> corresponding 'physical' events: IOW these events, with their 'dual
> description', constitute a single 'distinguished' *causal* sequence. By
> contrast, *any* of the myriad 'computational worlds' that could be
> ascribed to the same events must remain - to the computer, rather than
> the programmer - only arbitrary or 'imaginary' ones. This is why I
> described them as 'nested' - perhaps 'orthogonal' or 'imaginary' are
> better: they may - 'platonically' - exist somewhere in the plenitude,
> but causally disconnected from the physical world in which the computer
> participates. The computer doesn't 'know' anything about them.
> Consequently, how could they possess any 'communication channel' to the
> computer's - and our - world 'out there'?
>
> Of course I'm not claiming by this that machines couldn't be conscious.
> My claim is rather that if they are, it couldn't be solely in virtue of
> any 'imaginary computational worlds' imputed to them, but rather because
> they support some unique, distinguished process of *physical* emergence
> that also corresponds to a unique observer-world: and of course, mutatis
> mutandis, this must also apply to the 'mind-brain' relationship.
>
> If I'm wrong (as no doubt I am), ISTM I must have erred in some step or
> other of my logic above. How do I debug it?
>
> David
>
>
>
> On Sat, Jun 23, 2007 at 03:58:39PM +0100, David Nyman wrote:
> > On 23/06/07, Russell Standish <lists.domain.name.hidden
> <mailto:lists.domain.name.hidden>> wrote:
> >
> > RS: I don't think I ever really found myself in
> > disagreement with you. Rather, what is happening is symptomatic of us
> > trying to reach across the divide of JP Snow's two cultures. You are
> > obviously comfortable with the world of literary criticism, and your
> > style of writing reflects this. The trouble is that to someone
> brought
> > up on a diet of scientific and technical writing, the literary paper
> > may as well be written in ancient greek. Gibberish doesn't mean
> > rubbish or nonsense, just unintelligible.
> >
> > DN: It's interesting that you should perceive it in this way: I
> hadn't
> > thought about it like this, but I suspect you're not wrong. I
> haven't
> > consumed very much of your 'diet', and I have indeed read quite a
> lot of
> > stuff in the style you refer to, although I often find it rather
> > indigestible! But on the other hand, much of my professional
> experience has
> > been in the world of computer programming, right back to machine
> code days,
> > so I'm very aware of the difference between 'syntax' and
> 'semantics', and I
> > know too well how consequences can diverge wildly from a
> difference of a
> > single bit. How often have I heard the beleaguered self-tester
> wail "I
> > didn't *mean* that!"
>
> Interesting indeed. I wouldn't have guessed you to have been a
> programmer. Perhaps you are one of those rare souls with a foot in
> each camp. That could be be very productive!
>
> ...
>
> >
> > However, in the spirit of the original topic of the thread, I
> would prefer
> > to ask you directly about the plausibility (which, unless I've
> > misunderstood, you support?) of an AI-program being in principle
> > 'conscious'. I take this to entail that instantiating such a program
> > thereby implements an 'observer' that can respond to and share a
> reality, in
> > broadly the same terms, with human 'observers'. (I apologise in
> advance if
> > any paraphrase or short-hand I adopt misrepresents what you say
> in TON):
> >
>
> It seems plausible, certainly.
>
> > TON, as you comment in the book, takes the 'idealist' stance that
> 'concrete'
> > notions emerge from observation. Our own relative status as
> observers
> > participating in 'worlds' is then dependent on computational
> 'emergence'
> > from the plenitude of all possible bit-strings. Let's say that
> I'm such an
> > observer and I observe a 'computer' like the one I'm using now. The
> > 'computer' is a 3-person 'concrete emergent' in my 1-person
> world, and that
> > of the 'plurality' of observers with whom I'm in relation: we can
> 'interact'
> > with it. Now, we collectively *impute* that some aspect of its
> 3-person
> > behaviour (e.g. EM phenomena in its internal circuitry) is to be
> regarded as
> > 'running an AI program' (i.e. ISTM that this is what happens when we
> > 'compile and run' a program). In what way does such imputation
> entail the
> > evocation - despite the myriad possible 'concrete' instantiations
> that might
> > represent it - of a *stable* observer capable of participating in
> our shared
> > '1-person plural' context? IOW, I'm concerned that two different
> categories
> > are being conflated here: the 'world' at the 'observer level'
> that includes
> > me and the computer, and the 'world' of the program, which is
> 'nested'
> > inside this. How can this 'nested' world get any purchase on
> 'observables'
> > that are 'external' to it?
> >
>
> It is no different to a conscious being instantiated in a new-born
> baby (or 18 month old, or whenever babies actually become
> conscious). In some Platonic sense, all possible observers are already
> out there, but by physically instantiating it in our world, we are in
> effect opening up a communication channel between ourselves and the
> new consciousness.
>
> > As I re-read this question, I wonder whether I've already
> willy-nilly fallen
> > into the '2-cultures' gap again. But what I've asked seems to be
> directly
> > related to the issues raised by 'Olympia and Klara', and by the
> substitution
> > level dilemma posed by 'yes doctor'. Could you show me where -
> or if - I go
> > wrong, or does the 'language game' make our views forever mutually
> > unintelligible?
> >
> > David
> >
>
> This last post is perfectly lucid to me. I hope I've answered it
> adequately.
>
> Cheers
>
>
> --
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Mathematics
> UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpcoder.domain.name.hidden
> <mailto:hpcoder.domain.name.hidden>
> Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>
>
> >
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Received on Sun Jun 24 2007 - 16:23:13 PDT