On Jun 20, 8:56 am, "Mohsen Ravanbakhsh" <ravanbak....domain.name.hidden>
wrote:
> There is no first person experience problem, because there is no first
> person experience."
>
> Once more here you've interpreted the situation from a third person point of
> view. I don't care what YOU can conclude from MY behavior. It's ONE'S own
> perception of his OWN experience matters! and it is more obvious than any
> other fact.
Mohsen, I agree with what you're trying to say here, but I wonder
whether the best 'move' against Torgny's little 'game' (I'm sure he's
playing with us!) is actually to accept what he's saying. I can agree
with him that:
"there is no first person experience"
because I don't find myself 'experiencing' my 'first person
experience' (this would lead to an infinite regression of
'experiencers'). Rather, I find myself always simply participating in
a 1-person world, which is a subset of a larger participatory
actuality. Torgny is of course equally a participant in this
actuality. His error is that he confuses 3-person descriptions with
the 'participants' they merely 'represent'. 3-person descriptions are
always proxies for some distal participant, 'external' to our own 1-
person world: they are 'abstractions'.
As soon as one commits this cognitive error, one is of course struck
by the lack of 1-person characteristics from the proxy 3-person 'point
of view'. Quite correct: the proxy in itself *doesn't have* an
independent point of view: it's just a parasite on one's own 1-person
world. Metaphorically, it's a sort of 'mirror' that 'reflects' an
external actuality. 'Proxy Torgny' *represents* something else: i.e.
'Participatory Torgny' - and *he* of course may well be granted such a
point of view (as you imply) by reflexive analogy. But the two must
not be confused. Ironically, Torgny is presenting us with a textbook
case of the category error that arises from mistaking one's
'reflection' for oneself!
David
> What you're referring to, is another problem, namely the "other's mind". how
> we know that another human is experiencing what we do? We actually assume
> that to be true, that everyone has consciousness.
> But it doesn't justify the other mistake. This does not mean you can deny
> your possible(!) consciousness.
>
> "What you call "the subjective experience of first person" is just some sort
> of behaviour. When you claim that you have "the subjective experience of
> first person", I can see that you are just showing a special kind of
> behaviour. You behave as if you have "the subjective experience of first
> person". And it is possible for an enough complicated computer to show up
> the exact same behaviour. But in the case of the computer, you can see that
> there is no "subjective experience", there are just a lot of electrical
> fenomena interacting with each other.
>
> There is no first person experience problem, because there is no first
> person experience."
>
> Once more here you've interpreted the situation from a third person point of
> view. I don't care what YOU can conclude from MY behavior. It's ONE'S own
> perception of his OWN experience matters! and it is more obvious than any
> other fact.
>
> On 6/19/07, Torgny Tholerus <tor....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > > On Tuesday 19 June 2007 11:37:09 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
> > >> What you call "the subjective experience of first person" is just some
> > >> sort of behaviour. When you claim that you have "the subjective
> > >> experience
> > >> of first person", I can see that you are just showing a special kind of
> > >> behaviour. You behave as if you have "the subjective experience of
> > >> first
> > >> person". And it is possible for an enough complicated computer to show
> > >> up
> > >> the exact same behaviour. But in the case of the computer, you can see
> > >> that there is no "subjective experience", there are just a lot of
> > >> electrical fenomena interacting with each other.
>
> > >> There is no first person experience problem, because there is no first
> > >> person experience.
>
> > > In all your reasoning you implicitely use "consciousness" for example
> > when
> > > you
> > > says "When you claim that you have the subjective experience
> > > of first person, *I* can see that you are just showing a special kind of
> > > behaviour."
>
> > > Who/what is "I" ? Who/what is seeing ? What does it means for you to see
> > > if
> > > you have no inner representation of what you (hmmm if you're not
> > > conscious,
> > > you is not an appropriate word) see, what does it means to see at all ?
>
> > > In all your reasonning you allude to "I", this is what 1st pov is about
> > > not
> > > about you (the conscious being/knower) looking at another person as if
> > > there
> > > was no obsever (means you) in the observation.
>
> > > Quentin
>
> > Our language is very primitive. You can not decribe the reality with it.
>
> > If you have a computer robot with a camera and an arm, how should that
> > robot express itself to descibe what it observes? Could the robot say: "I
> > see a red brick and a blue brick, och when I take the blue brick and
> > places it on the red brick, then I see that the blue brick is over the red
> > brick."?
>
> > But if the robot says this, then you will say that this proves that the
> > robot is conscious, because it uses the word "I".
>
> > How shall the robot express itself, so it will be correct? It this
> > possible? Or is our language incapable of expressing reality?
>
> > We human beings are slaves under our language. The language restricts out
> > thinking.
>
> > --
> > Torgny Tholerus
>
> --
>
> Mohsen Ravanbakhsh,
> Sharif University of Technology,
> Tehran.
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Received on Wed Jun 20 2007 - 11:09:36 PDT