Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

From: Bruno Marchal <>
Date: Fri, 15 Jun 2007 16:01:48 +0200

David, Tom, Stephen,

I keep your posts and I will comment them the week after the next one.
I have also to finish a post for Stephen Paul King about bisimulation
and identity. I'm out of my office the whole next week. I hope my
mail-box will survive :)

Best Regards,


Le 15-juin-07, à 03:16, David Nyman a écrit :

> The 'substrate' to which I refer is not matter or anything else in
> particular, but a logical-semantic 'substrate' from which 'mind' or
> 'matter' could emerge. On this basis, 'sense-action' (i.e. two
> differentiated 'entities' primitively 'sensing' each other in order to
> 'interact') is a logical, or at least semantically coherent,
> requirement. For example, if you want to use a particle-force
> analogy, then the 'force' would be the medium of exchange of sense-
> action - i.e. relationship. In Kant's ontology, his windowless monads
> had no such means of exchange (the 'void' prevented it) and
> consequently divine intervention had to do the 'trick'. I'm hoping
> that Bruno will help me with the appropriate analogy for AR+COMP.

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Received on Fri Jun 15 2007 - 10:01:56 PDT

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