Re: Asifism

From: David Nyman <david.nyman.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Tue, 12 Jun 2007 14:06:58 -0000

On Jun 12, 2:01 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc....domain.name.hidden> wrote:

> > If we take AR to be that which is self-asserting,
>
> We don't have too, even without comp, in the sense that, with AR
> (Arithmetical Realism) we cannot not take into account the relative
> reflexivity power of the number's themselves.

I simply meant that in AR numbers 'assert themselves', in that they
are taken as being (in some sense) primitive rather than being merely
mental constructs (intuitionism, I think?) Is this not so?

> OK (but again the "symmetry-breaking" is a consequence (too be sure
> there remains technical problems ...)

I meant here by 'symmetry-breaking' the differentiating of an 'AR
field' - perhaps continuum might be better - into 'numbers'. My
fundamental explanatory intuition posits a continuum that is
'modulated' ('vibration', 'wave motion'?) into 'parts'. The notion of
a 'modulated continuum' seems necessary to avoid the paradox of
'parts' separated by 'nothing'. The quotes I have sprinkled so
liberally are intended to mark out the main semantic elements that I
feel need to be accounted for somehow. 'Parts' (particles, digits)
then emerge through self-consistent povs abstracted from the
continuum. Is there an analogous continuous 'number field' in AR,
from which, say, integers, emerge 'digitally'?

> Actually if COMP does not give the right physics, that would be
> interesting too. In such a case we could use comp and experimental
> physics to measure somehow the degree of non-computability, well not of
> the physical world which is necessary not completely computable with
> the comp hyp, but of our mind. But of course if comp leads directly to
> the right physics, that would be nice, sure.

Agreed. But actually I meant that you would wish it to be an
empirical matter (rather than Father Jack's 'ecumenical' one!)

It seems to me that overall in this exchange we seem to be more in
agreement than sometimes formerly. Would you still describe my
position as positing 'consciousness' as primitive? That's not my own
intuition. Rather, I'm trying to reverse the finger we point towards
the 'external' world when we seek to indicate the direction of 'what
exists'. I'm also stressing the immediacy of the mutual 'grasp' that
self-motivates the elements of what is real, and which constitutes
simultaneously their 'awareness' and their 'causal power' - and
consequently our own. Beyond this, we seem to be in substantial
agreement that all complexity, including of course reflexive self-
consciousness', is necessarily a higher-order emergent from such basic
givens (which seem to me, in some form at least, intuitively
unavoidable).

David

> Le 11-juin-07, 13:24, David Nyman wrote in part: (I agree with the
> non quoted part) ....
>
> > Are we any closer to agreement, mutatis terminoligical mutandis? My
> > scheme does not take 'matter' to be fundamental, but rather an
> > emergent (with 'mind') from something prior that possesses the
> > characteristics of self-assertion, self-sensing, and self-action. I
> > posit these because they are what is (Occamishly) required to save the
> > appearances.
>
> ... And here too.
>
> > If we take AR to be that which is self-asserting,
>
> We don't have too, even without comp, in the sense that, with AR
> (Arithmetical Realism) we cannot not take into account the relative
> reflexivity power of the number's themselves.
>
> > with
> > its intrinsic (arithmetical) set of symmetry-breaking axioms,
>
> OK (but again the "symmetry-breaking" is a consequence (too be sure
> there remains technical problems ...)
>
> > then
> > COMP perhaps can stand for the process that drives this potential
> > towards emergent layers of self-action and self-sensing.
>
> Yes. Perhaps, indeed.
>
> > It then
> > becomes an empirical programme whether AR+COMP possesses the synthetic
> > power to save all the necessary phenomena.
>
> Exactly.
>
> > As you would wish it, I
> > imagine.
>
> Actually if COMP does not give the right physics, that would be
> interesting too. In such a case we could use comp and experimental
> physics to measure somehow the degree of non-computability, well not of
> the physical world which is necessary not completely computable with
> the comp hyp, but of our mind. But of course if comp leads directly to
> the right physics, that would be nice, sure.
>
> Bruno
>
> htttp://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Received on Tue Jun 12 2007 - 10:07:07 PDT

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