On Sat, 16 Oct 1999, Christopher Maloney wrote:
> Very simply, the ASSA states that for each of us, the observer moment
> we are experiencing right now is chosen at random from the entire set
> of observer moments, based on their measure. Calculating the measure
> is problematic, but it is related to the number of (physical?)
> implementations of that state within all possible universes. Anyway,
> the measure should, in principle, be calculable.
It's not chosen at random. Just that the entire set of
observations exists, which implies the same things about effective
probabilities that are always the case when the entire set of something
exists.
> With "strict ASSA", it is meaningless to talk about what I'll observe
> tomorrow, or at any future time. All I can do to make predictions is
> to calculate probabilities such as "given that an observer sees the
> time as t, and given that this observer has memories a, b, c, ...,
> he can expect to observe M with probability P." Thus, with what I'm
> calling "strict ASSA", I can't necessarily identify that observer with
> myself, if the time t is not the current time.
That is with one defintion of identity.
> Now, Jacques himself has admitted that the "strict ASSA" can be
> supplemented with a definition of "you", in order that you *can*
> make predictions about what you'll see tomorrow:
>
> > one must first define "you". There are three reasonable
> > possibilities in the ASSA:
> > 1. One particular observer-moment. You have no past and no future.
> > 2. A set of observer moments linked by computation. With this
> > definition the problem is that "you" may be two (or more) people
> > at the same time! The advantage with this definition is that one
> > can predict effective probabilities of what "you" will see at other
> > times similar to what you want to do with the RSSA. Thing is, if
> > there is nonconservation of measure, the predictions start to differ
> > from the RSSA about things like how old you should expect to be.
> > Remember, testable prediction do NOT depend on definitions, so it is
> > often better to use def. #1 to prevent such confusion.
> > 3. A particular implementation of an extended computation. Similar to
> > 2; allows death, when that implementation ends. I prefer this or #1.
>
> I'd submit (and I'm going to guess that this is anticipated) that the
> ASSA with definition 2 (which I'll denote ASSA-2) is the same as what
> we've been calling the RSSA.
>
> It's not ambiguous: if you define yourself to be a set of observer
> moments linked by computation, and you make a prediction of what you'll
> observe tomorrow, then you are, by virtue of that definition and premise,
> excluding the possibility of death. I disagree that the "predictions
> start to differ from the RSSA ...", because this sort of prediction from
> ASSA-2 would be of the form:
>
> "If I were to survive 1000 years, then I'd have a 50% chance of
> being purple".
>
> And this says nothing about the absolute (the A in ASSA) chance of
> surviving 1000 years. But as Jacques vociferously points out, the
> ASSA itself predicts that probability to be low.
It's different. In the RSSA, you predict that probability would
never be low unless it's zero.
> It's interesting that Jacques picked a pseudo-random number (463) to
> illustrate his point. I keep thinking that maybe I'm missing something
> here, but I'm not. Of course what each of us observes, at this particular
> moment (our little observer moment) is randomly SAMPLED from the set of
> possibilities, hence the ASSA. Any way you slice it, from a subjective
> point of view, there is randomness. Where there are probabilities, there
> is randomness. In the above example, observer 463 would say, "my, 463
> seems like a pretty random number, I don't think I could have predicted
> that."
Most observers will say that to themselves. So there is the
illusion of randomness. The ASSA explains that illusion
deterministically.
> If I read you right, you're saying that you reject the RSSA because you're
> not old. But I'm more inclined to reject the ASSA because I'm not dead.
That makes no sense. The ASSA predicts that all observations will
be made by observers that are not already dead. (Though they may be
dying, being born, or both.)
> > Sounds like circular reasoning, as stated above, because the AUH
> > is itself justified only because of Occam's razor.
>
> I disagree. I think the AUH could be argued for because it is a "zero-
> information theory", independent of Occam's razor. Granted, it *is* the
> simplest possible explanation, but that's not, in my opinion, the
> fundamental justification for it.
Why is a 0-info theory better? Occam's razor is the only reason
for that.
BTW a 0-info theory obviously is completely deterministic.
Randomness would require info, to specify the undetermined particulars
such as which copy is _really_ Bruno. Any illusion of randomness in a
0-info theory would have to be explained as effective randomness. This is
one reason I favor effective randomness over real randomness.
- - - - - - -
Jacques Mallah (jqm1584.domain.name.hidden)
Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL:
http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/
Received on Thu Nov 04 1999 - 13:18:33 PST