Re: Speaking about "Mathematicalism"

From: Bruno Marchal <>
Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2007 17:01:30 +0200

Le 09-avr.-07, à 17:06, John M a écrit :

> Thanks, Quentin.
> It seems AoC is not contrary to the line I represented.
> *
> To your other post: I did not feel any pejorating in Peter's
> "Brunoism". Bruno is appreciated with his "23rd c". views. (He joked
> about it, calling the list as 100 years ahead, himself 200).
> I have only ONE (logic?) objection: we all 'think ' with our 21th c.
> brains and 'organize' nature (existence, world, origins, etc.) - i.e.
> a sort of 'prescription for nature, how it *ever* 'should be' built -
> accordingly. It is different from the 'turtle', Kronos', 'Indra's',
> the 'Big Manitou's', even the 'Big Bang's' follies at different levels
> of our actual epistemic developmental stages. So is even the 23rd c.
> Brunoism in 21st c. math logic. My precise prescription is:
>  - We don't know, we can speculate.  -
> Speculation is good, I do it, but I beware of drawing to long
> consecutive series upon its ASSUMED circumstances and warn others to
> regard them as 'facts' especially in the nth level of lit. repetitions
> (by calling it my 'narrative' to begin with).
> Whether 'numbers' originated the conscious mind or vice versa, (even
> if Bruno restricts this idea to the natural integers, for the sake of
> simplicity),

I cannot imagine something more difficult than "natural numbers". The
other numbers have been invented/discovered and used to simplify

> whether those unidentified numbers have any force-activity to
> construct anything, or is it something else still undiscovered today,
> generating even the numbers (math) in OUR thinking, (substituted by an
> unknowable "god" concept in many minds), is MY open question.

OK. Note that with comp such a question is necessarily open, forever.

> The 'mind-body' thesis is no good answer, because mind is unidentified
> and body is not a primary concept (mostly assumed as 'material', in
> the 'physical' figment of our explanatory sequence in learning about
> the world).

I guess you mean 'mind-body identity thesis" (for mind-body thesis). OK
then. Again this is provably so with the comp assumption. Matter, as we
see it and as we measure it relatively to our most probable
computational histories, just cannot be primarily material. This is
what the UDA is all about.

> My ramblings conclude into: it all may be right (in conditional). My
> criticism aims at triggering (teasing?) better arguments. So are my
> questions.

We, humans, discussed comp since more than 3000 years. From that
historical perspective we could doubt such discussion is worthwhile.
But today we have made a giant step. We know that if we are machine
(comp is true) then we will never believe in comp in any completely
rational way. On the contrary, the more we understand comp, the less we
can believe in it. It really asks for a spiritual, not entirely
rational, counter-intuitive act of faith.
But then comp has also concrete and testable consequences, and that
points on a way to make even more progress, by digging a bit the math
so as to make a precise refutation of comp. But until now, comp
predicts only a sort of incredible weirdness, which is different from a
contradiction, and this is even more true when nature seems to confirm
a very similar kind of weirdness.



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Received on Wed Apr 11 2007 - 11:01:40 PDT

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