Le 17-mars-07, à 00:11, Brent Meeker a écrit :
> But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent
> universe? or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite
> arithmetic (which would be a much smaller "everything").
>
> And how do things "run" in Platonia? Do we need temporal modes in
> logic, as well as epistemic ones?
Brent, for what I understand, you seem to believe in both a material
primitive universe, and in the computationalist hypothesis. It is just
up to you, then, to find an error in the Universal Dovetailer argument.
This is a proof, a destructive platonic thought experiment in the sense
of James Brown (the lboratory of mind) that you cannot have both
materialism and computationalism. The argument should make us more
modest: it shows that we have to explain matter from mind.
Then I provide a path for extracting physics from numbers, by
interviewing Peano Arithmetic, or any lobian machine, and *she* forces
an important number of nuanced distinction between computing, proving,
knowing, and an infinity of commitment gamblings: which correspond to
the (arithmetical hypostases):
p (truth)
Bp (provable)
Bp & p (knowable, correctly provabie)
Bp & Dp (gamblings)
Bp & Dp & p (correct gambling, feeling)
And the incompleteness phenomenon multiplies by 2 most of the
hypostases, by distinguishing what the machine can say about them and
what is true about them. This gives 8 modal logics, which, as I have
explained some time ago, determines each a "geometrical" (Kripke)
multiverse.
It makes comp (and the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus
theology) experimentally testable.
As I said in the FOR list, we have to take into account two major
discovery:
The universal machine (talks bits)
The other universal machine (the quantum universal machine, she talks
qubits).
The UDA shows that if comp is true there is necessary a path from bits
to qubits, and, by the G G* distinction, it provided an explanation of
both quanta and qualia from numbers (and addition and multiplication).
I have not extracted the measure (nor do I think Russell did to be
honest), but I have extracted the logic of certainty (credibility one)
associated to each hypostasis, and those corresponding to Plotinus
Matter (or "our" measure *one*) is already perhaps enough quantum like
to justify a quantum topology or "deep enough" universal machine.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Received on Sat Mar 17 2007 - 11:03:08 PDT