Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

From: Brent Meeker <>
Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2007 09:00:56 -0800

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On 3/16/07, *Brent Meeker* <
> <>> wrote:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > I think it's more like asking why are we aware of 17 and
> other small
> > numbers but no integers greater that say 10^10^20 - i.e.
> almost all
> > of them. A theory that just says "all integers exist"
> doesn't help
> > answer that. But if the integers are something we "make up"
> (or are
> > hardwired by evolution) then it makes sense that we are only
> > acquainted with small ones.
> >
> >
> > OK, but there are other questions that defy such an explanation.
> Suppose
> > the universe were infinite, as per Tegmark Level 1, and contained an
> > infinite number of observers. Wouldn't that make your measure
> > effectively zero? And yet here you are.
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou
> Another observation refuting Tegmark! :-)
> Seriously, even in the finite universe we observe my probability is
> almost zero. Almost everything and and everyone is improbable, just
> like my winning the lottery when I buy one [in] a million tickets is
> improbable - but someone has to win. So it's a question of relative
> measure. Each integer has zero measure in the set of all integers -
> yet we are acquainted with some and not others. So why is the
> "acquaintance measure" of small integers so much greater than that
> of integers greater than 10^10^20 ( i.e. almost all of them). What
> picks out the small integers?
> There are factors creating a local measure, even if the Plenitude is
> infinite and measureless. Although the chance that you will be you is
> zero or almost zero if you consider the Plenitude as God's big lucky
> dip, you have to be someone given that we are talking about observers,
> and once you are that fantastically improbable person,

In other words, "That's just the way it is.", which comports with my complaint that such theories are empty.

Brent Meeker

>it becomes a
> certainty that you will remain him for as long as there are future
> versions of him extant anywhere at all. Thus, the first person
> perspective, necessarily from within the plenitude, makes a global
> impossibility a local certainty.
> Stathis Papaioannou
> >

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Received on Fri Mar 16 2007 - 13:01:17 PDT

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