Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

From: Bruno Marchal <>
Date: Thu, 15 Mar 2007 15:25:29 +0100

Le 14-mars-07, à 04:42, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

> On 3/13/07, Bruno Marchal <> wrote:
> > You could say that a hydrogen atom cannot be reduced to an electron
> +
> > proton because it exhibits behaviour not exhibited in any of its
> > components;
> Nor by any juxtaposition of its components in case of some prior
> entanglement. In that case I can expect some bits of information from
> looking only the electron, and some bits from looking only the proton,
> but an observation of the whole atom would makes those bits not
> genuine. It is weird but the quantum facts confirms this QM prediction.
> Quantum weirdness is an observed fact. We assume that it is, somehow,
> an intrinsic property of subatomic particles; but perhaps there is a
> hidden factor or as yet undiscovered theory which may explain it
> further.

That would be equivalent to adding hidden variables. But then they have
to be non local (just to address the facts, not just the theory).
Of course if the hidden factor is given by the "many worlds" or comp,
then such non local effects has to be retrospectively expected. But
then we have to forget the idea that substance (decomposable reality)
exists, but numbers.

> You could get a neutron at high enough energies, I suppose, but I
> don't think that is what you mean. Is it possible to bring a proton
> and an electron appropriately together and have them just sit there
> next to each other?

Locally yes. In QM this is given by a tensor product of the
corresponding states. But it is an exceptional state. With comp it is
open if such "physical state" acn ever be prepared, even locally.

> There is no sense to say
> an atom is part of the UD. It is "part" of the necessary discourse of
> self-observing machine. Recall comp makes physics branch of machine's
> psychology/theology.
> Isn't that the *ultimate* reduction of everything?

Given that a theology rarely eliminates subjects/person, I don't see in
what reasonable sense this would be a reduction.

> Not really because the knot is a topological object. Its identity is
> defined by the class of equivalence for some topological transformation
> from your 3D description. If you put the knot in your pocket so that it
> changes its 3D shape (but is not broken) then it conserve its knot
> identity which is only locally equivalent with the 3D shape. To see
> the
> global equivalence will be tricky, and there is no algorithm telling
> for sure you can identify a knot from a 3D description.
> People can look here for a cute knot table:
> I was thinking of a physical knot, which is not the same as the
> Platonic ideal, even if there is no such thing as a separate physical
> reality.

I don't know what you mean by a physical knots. In any case the
identity of a knots (mathematical, physical) rely in its topology, not
in such or such cartesian picture, even the "concrete" knots I put in
my pocket. The knots looses its identity if it is cut.

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Received on Thu Mar 15 2007 - 10:31:09 PDT

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