On Mar 14, 9:44 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <stath....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> On 3/14/07, Kim Jones <kimjo....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> It is
> conceivable that the physical world might not exist, or God not exist, or
> God exist but not make the physical world, but it is not conceivable that
> circles or integers or the UD not exist as mathematical objects.
>
In what sense 'not conceivable'? I don't find it hard to conceive of
mathematical objects not existing, given that nothing else does
either. 'Nothing else' here simply but radically entails that whatever
you say you can 'conceive', my response is 'not that either'. This
'nothing' precisely is the nothing from which *nothing* can come. Our
own existence contingently rules it out, which is what makes it so
hard to think about. Such a 'possibility', being in fact necessary in
'all possible worlds', paradoxically abolishes the conceiver at the
moment of conception.
David
> A little refresher now:
>
>
>
> > On 31/12/2006, at 8:25 AM, Tom Caylor wrote:
>
> > > Besides the question of how meaning relates to this List, the question
> > > of meaning itself can be asked at several different levels, so I'll
> > > list a few:
>
> > > 1) Why does the universe exist? Why is there something rather than
> > > nothing?
> > > 2) Why do human beings in general exist?
> > > 3) Why do I exist?
>
> > I think we need more on question 1
>
> Thanks for reminding us of the original questions, it's easy to get lost in
> a thread this long. For me, one of the more compelling reasons for
> entertaining some version of the idea that mathematical existence is all
> there is to apparent physical reality is that it answers this question:
> physical reality, including God (if he exists, and contra the ontological
> argument), is contingent; mathematical truths are necessary. It is
> conceivable that the physical world might not exist, or God not exist, or
> God exist but not make the physical world, but it is not conceivable that
> circles or integers or the UD not exist as mathematical objects.
>
> Stathis Papaioannou
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Received on Wed Mar 14 2007 - 08:40:51 PDT