Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
> On 2/20/07, *Jesse Mazer* <lasermazer.domain.name.hidden
> <mailto:lasermazer.domain.name.hidden>> wrote:
>
>
> >I would bet on functionalism as the correct theory of mind for various
> >reasons, but I don't see that there is anything illogical the
> possibility
> >that consciousness is substrate-dependent. Let's say that when you
> rub two
> >carbon atoms together they have a scratchy experience, whereas
> when you rub
> >two silicon atoms together they have a squirmy experience. This
> could just
> >be a mundane fact about the universe, no more mysterious than any
> other
> >basic physical fact. What is illogical, however, is the "no
> causal effect"
> >criterion if this is called epiphenomenalism. If the effect is
> purely and
> >necessarily on first person experience, it's no less an effect; we
> might
> >not
> >notice if the carbon atoms were zombified, but the carbon atoms would
> >certainly notice. I think it all comes down to the deep-seated and
> very
> >obviously wrong idea that only third person empirical data is genuine
> >empirical data. It is a legitimate concern of science that data
> should be
> >verifiable and experiments repeatable, but it's taking it a bit far to
> >conclude from this that we are therefore all zombies.
> >
> >Stathis Papaioannou
>
> One major argument against the idea that qualia and/or consciousness
> could
> be substrate-dependent is what philosopher David Chalmers refers to
> as the
> "dancing qualia" and "fading qualia" arguments, which you can read more
> about at http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html . As a thought-experiment,
> imagine gradually replacing neurons in my brain with functionally
> identical
> devices whose physical construction was quite different from neurons
> (silicon chips emulating the input and output of the neurons they
> replaced,
> perhaps). If one believes that this substrate is associated with either
> different qualia or absent qualia, then as one gradually replaces
> more and
> more of my brain, they'll either have to be a sudden discontinuous
> change
> (and it seems implausible that the replacement of a single neuron would
> cause such a radical change) or else a gradual shift or fade-out of the
> qualia my brain experiences...but if I were noticing such a shift or
> fade-out, I would expect to be able to comment on it, and yet the
> assumption
> that the new parts are functionally identical means my behavior
> should be
> indistinguishable from what it would be if my neurons were left
> alone. And
> if we suppose that I might be having panicked thoughts about a
> change in my
> perceptions yet find that my voice and body are acting as if nothing is
> wrong, and there is no neural activity associated with these panicked
> thoughts, then there would have to be a radical disconnect between
> subjective experiences and physical activity in my brain, which would
> contradict the assumption of supervenience (see
> http://philosophy.uwaterloo.ca/MindDict/supervenience.html ) and
> lead to the
> possibility of radical mind/body disconnects like rocks and trees
> having
> complex thoughts and experiences that have nothing to do with any
> physical
> activity within them.
>
> Jesse
>
>
> It's a persuasive argument, but I can think of a mechanism whereby your
> qualia can fade away and you wouldn't notice. In some cases of cortical
> blindness, in which the visual cortex is damaged but the rest of the
> visual pathways intact, patients insist that they are not blind and come
> up with explanations as to why they fall over and walk into things, eg.
> they accuse people of putting obstacles in their way while their back is
> turned. This isn't just denial because it is specific to cortical
> lesions, not blindness due to other reasons. If these patients had
> advanced cyborg implants they could presumably convince the world, and
> be convinced themselves, that their visual perception had not suffered
> when in fact they can't see a thing. Perhaps gradual cyborgisation of
> the brain as per Hans Moravec would lead to a similar, gradual fading of
> thoughts and perceptions; the external observer would not notice any
> change and the subject would not notice any change either, until he was
> dead, replaced by a zombie.
>
> Stathis Papaioannou
An interesting example. Are these people completely blind? Do they describe seeing things?
Brent Meeker
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Received on Tue Feb 20 2007 - 14:40:31 PST