Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

From: John Mikes <jamikes.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Sun, 18 Feb 2007 17:21:25 -0500

Bruno,

I appreciate your 'belated' reply (although some points stayed open)
and I will resort at the "belated" myself.
I found your points a Leporello from the "Hochprimitive" all the way
to the extreme technical (not included now), so I have to do some
equilibrating in my own mind. I hate to go back to 0.1.2.3. - or to
the level of 1+1=2. When we are talking about human problems (I
mean: thought, existence, etc) it is denigrating,
Will consider, will post.

John

On 2/5/07, Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>
> Hi John,
>
>
> Le 03-févr.-07, à 17:20, John Mikes a écrit :
>
> > Stathis, Bruno,
> >
> > This summary sounds fine if I accept to 'let words go'. Is there a
> > way to
> > 'understand' (=use with comprehension) the 'words' used here without
> > the
> > 'technical' acceptance of the theoretical platform?
>
>
> I am not sure. Avoiding technical acceptance of a theoretical platform
> can be done for presenting result, not really for discussing about
> them.
>
>
>
> > There are sacrosanct 'words' used without explaining them (over and
> > over again?, BUT
> > at least once for the benefit of that newcomer 'alien' who comes from
> > another vista' ,
> > like
> >
> > (absolute?) probability - is there such a thing as probability, the
> > figment that
> > if it happend x times it WILL happen the (X+one)th time as well?
>
>
> This is inductive inference, not probability.
>
>
>
>
> > combined with
> > the statistical hoax of counting from select members in a limited
> > group the version
> > 'A' models and assuming its 'probability'?
>
>
> That is why to use probability and/or any uncertainty measure we have
> to be clear about the axioms we are willing to admit, at least for the
> sake of some argument.
>
>
>
>
> >
> > observer moment (observer, for that matter), whether the moment is a
> > time-concept
> > in it and the 'observer' must be conscious (btw: identifying
> > 'conscious')
>
>
> The expression "observer moment" has originated with Nick Bostrom, in
> context similar to the doomsday argument. I would call them "first
> person observer moment". I will try to explain how to translate them in
> comp.
>
>
>
>
> >
> > number (in the broader sense, yet applied as real integers) (Btw: are
> > the 'non-Arabic'
> > numbers also numbers? the figments of evolutionary languages
> > alp[habetical or not?
> > Is zero a number? Was not in "Platonia" - a millennium before its
> > invention(?!)
>
>
> Number, by default are the so called "natural number": 0, 1, 2, 3, 4,
> ...
> They correspond to the number of strokes in the following sequence of
> sets:
> { }, { I }, { II }, { III }, { IIII }, { IIIII }, { IIIIII }, {
> IIIIIII }, { IIIIIIII }, etc.
>
> Zero is a number by definition. But this is just a question of
> definition. For the Greeks number begins with three. Like the adjective
> "numerous" still rarely applies when only two things are referred too.
>
>
>
>
> >
> > The 'extensions' of machine into (loebian etc.) [non?]-machine, like
> > comp into the nondigital
>
>
>
> ? comp does not go out of the digital, except from a first person point
> of view (but that is an hard technical point, to be sure).
>
> In "english" I would define a "universal (digital) machine", by a
> digital machine potentially capable of emulating (simulating perfectly)
> any other digital machine from a description of it. Today's computers
> and interpreters are typical example of such "hard" and soft
> (respectively) universal machines. Now a universal digital machine is
> lobian when she "knows" that she is universal. Defining "knows" has to
> be a bit technical. This is not at all an official definition. Look at
> my SANE04 paper for a more offical definition. It is related to a sort
> of placebo phenomenon. If we continue this conversation there will be
> plenty of time to make this clear. But you are right to ask for
> definition, or for more explanations.
>
>
>
>
> > and mixing our mental interpretations with what has been
> > interpreted (unknowable).
>
>
> Don't hesitate to come back on this? Out of context I could say to much
> things and then have to repeat it.
>
>
>
>
> >
> > Just some picked examples promoting a not-so-technical glossary for
> > the rest of the world
>
>
> Make a list, and send it. So we can think about. Not all
> conversation-threads ask for the same level of precision.
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> >
> > John M
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On 2/3/07, Stathis Papaioannou <stathispapaioannou.domain.name.hidden>
> > wrote:Bruno Marchal writes:
> >>
> >> > What is correct, and has been singled out by Stathis, is that comp
> >> > eludes the "material implementation" problem, given that we take all
> >> > abstract possible relationship between those objects, and they are
> >> all
> >> > well defined as purely number theoretical relations. Note that this
> >> is
> >> > something I have tried to explain to Jacques Mallah sometimes ago,
> >> but
> >> > without much success. This does not make much sense in ASSA
> >> approaches,
> >> > but, like George Levy I think, I don't believe in absolute
> >> probability
> >> > of being me, or of living my current "observer moment". Such a
> >> > probability can be given the value one (said George) but it is
> >> close of
> >> > saying that the universe is here, which tells us nothing, really.
> >> It is
> >> > like answering "who are you?" by I am me".
> >>
> >> I'm satisfied with this summary. The physical implementation problem
> >> is not
> >> a problem when considering abstract machines.
> >>
> >> Stathis Papaioannou
> >>
> >>
> >
> >
> > >
> >
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
> >
>

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Received on Sun Feb 18 2007 - 17:21:36 PST

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