Re: Searles' Fundamental Error

From: Mark Peaty <>
Date: Sat, 17 Feb 2007 11:42:19 +0900

My apologies if my replying seems a bit slow. I *have* been thinking
about these things though. I thought to try and make excuses, but really
all that is necessary, amongst ethical correspondents anyway, is a
forthright confession of mental inadequacy, n'est ce pas? :-)

I think 'kicks back' = measurable in some way.
I think 'exists' is a generic, irreducible, ultimate value. In fact it
is THE generic, irreducible, ultimate value and it underlies
mathematical objects such as numbers as well as everything else. I will
try and give an account of this assertion in my reply to Bruno on this
thread because Bruno has provided the biggest challenge to my, uhhh,
maturing brain. I have no real hopes of discovering a/the 'killer'
argument, apart from claiming that 'Comp' always begs the question.

Mark Peaty CDES

Russell Standish wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 07, 2007 at 06:10:34PM -0500, John M wrote:
>> I can't wait for Bruno's (and others') versions.
>> John M
> My take on physical and existence.
> Physical: that which "kicks back" in the Samuel Johnson sense. It
> doesn't rule out idealism, because the virtual reality in a VR
> simulation also kicks back.
> Existence: This is a word with many meanings. To use it, one should
> first say what type of existence you mean. For instance mathematical
> existence means a property of a number that is true - eg "47 is
> prime". Anthropic existence might mean something that "kicks back" to
> some observer somewhere in the plenitude of possibilities. There is
> another type of existence referring to that which "kicks back" to me
> here, right now. And so on.
> It is possible to say "physical existence = mathematical existence" as
> Tegmark does, but this is almost a definition, rather than a statement
> of metaphysics.
> Cheers

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Received on Fri Feb 16 2007 - 21:43:29 PST

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