Re: Searles' Fundamental Error

From: Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Fri, 9 Feb 2007 11:10:51 +0100

Le 07-févr.-07, à 17:34, Mark Peaty a écrit :

> Bruno: 'Dont hesitate to ask why, I am sure few people have
> understand the whole point. Some are close to it, perhaps by having
> figure this out by themselves.'
>
> MP: Don't look at me boss ... I'm just glad I don't have to
> understand 'it' to be able to exist within it!


Of course! Like babies can use their brain without understanding it ...



>
> SO, yes I will ask: What do you mean by 'physical'?



It concerns the stable appearance described by hypothetical "physical
theories" (like classical mechanics, QM, etc.).

I found an argument showing that IF comp(*) is correct THEN those
stable appearances emerge from arithmetic as seen from internalized
point of views. Those can be described in computer science, and It
makes the comp hyp falsifiable: just extract the physical appearance
from comp and compare with nature. I will say more in a reply to
Stathis.



(*) comp means there exist a tuiring emulable level of description of
"myself" (whatever I am), meaning I would notice a functional
substitution made at that level).




>
> And next: what do you mean by 'exist'?

There are mainly two sort of existence. The absolute fundamental one,
and the internal or phenomenological one.
If you understand the Universal Dovetailer Argument, you can understand
that, assuming the comp hypothesis, it is enough to interpret existence
by the existential quantifier in some first order logic description of
arithmetic. (like when you say "it exist a prime number").
All the other existence (like headache, but also bosons, fermions,
anyons, ...) are phenomelogical, and can be described by "It exist a
stable and coherent collection of machines correctly believing from
their point of view in "bosons", etc. (I simplify a bit).

If you want, I say that IF comp is true, only numbers exist, all the
rest are dreams with relative degree of stability.





>
> These are very basic questions, and in our context here, 'dumb'
> questions for sure, but without some clarification on how people are
> using these words, I don't think I can go any further.

You are welcome, and I don't believe there is dumb questions. I have
developed the Universal dovetailer argument, in the seventies, and it
was a pedagogical tools for explaining the mathematical theory which
consist in interviewing an universal machine on its possible physics.
I have published all this in the eighties and defend it as a thesis in
the nineties. I am aware it goes against materialism (based on the
concept of primary (aristotelian) materialism.
All this provides mathematical clean interpretation of neoplatonist
researchers (like Plato, Plotinus, Proclus). If you want I show that
concerning machine's theology it is wrong to reify matter or nature.

Note that I am using the term "materialism" in a weaker sense than its
use in philosophy of mind. But materialism I mean the metaphysical
reification of Matter. The idea that some primitive matter exists.

Hope this helps a bit. Perhaps you could study my last version of UDA
in my SANE04 paper to see the point. You can ask question for any step.
Then if you are willing to invest in mathematical logic, you will see
how the UDA can be made entirely mathematical *and* falsifiable.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Received on Fri Feb 09 2007 - 05:11:22 PST

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