Bruno Marchal writes:
> Le 02-janv.-07, à 08:07, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
> > You could speculate that the experience of digging holes involves the
> > dirt, the shovel, robot sensors and effectors, the power supply as
> > well as the central processor, which would mean that virtual reality
> > by playing with just the central processor is impossible. This is
> > perhaps what Colin Hales has been arguing, and is contrary to
> > computationalism.
>
>
> Again, putting the environment, with some level of details, in the
> "generalized brain" is not contrary to comp. Only if you explicitly
> mention that the shovel, or the sensors, or the power supply, .... are
> not turing emulable, then that would be contrary to comp.
That's what I meant: an emulated shovel would not do, because the robot would
somehow know if the data telling it it was handling a shovel did not originate
in the real world, even if the sensory feeds were perfectly emulated. In the robot's
case this would entail a non-computationalist theory of computer consciousness!
Stathis Papaioannou
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Received on Tue Jan 02 2007 - 08:09:57 PST