Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Le 18-déc.-06, à 20:04, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> ...
>>>> Moreover, I don't have to justify it in terms of other
>>>> ethical principles or commandments from God:
>>>
>>> With (a)comp, you have to NOT justify it in terms of God. With comp
>>> (and God = +/- Plotinus'one) we could justify that any *action* made
>>> in
>>> the name of God is bad, even saving the planet from some attack by
>>> horrible monster ...
>> That seems to be a reductio against comp.
>
>
> I know it seems a little bit paradoxical, but then it is my methodology
> to take seriously the interview of the lobian machine, which is
> "famous" for its many paradoxical thoughts.
> It is certainly not a reductio against comp, given that we are not
> arriving at a genuine contradiction. It just happens that "goodness" is
> as unnameable as truth.
> Now, concerning this paradox, it seems to me intuitively
> comprehensible. If someone saves me from some horrible pain, then that
> is (arguably) good; but if he does that in the *name* of "good", I can
> understand that this naming depreciates its action. Even if personally
> I am still benefiting from that situation, the naming could make me
> uneasy, and who knows what will be done under that or any name.
A little uneasiness about what someone might do in the future is hardly enough to transform a good act into a bad one. It seems you are saying that if the good samaritan claimed to have performed his kind act *for any reason whatsoever* it would become a bad act. That sounds like a reductio to me.
>>> Witrh comp (and the "ideal" case of self-referentially correct
>>> machine)
>>> it is just impossible for a machine to do something good and at the
>>> same time telling she is doing something good ... (similar paradoxes
>>> are illustrated in taoist and buddhist tales).
>> So one cannot be reflective about one's actions and conclude they are
>> good? That sounds like nonsense.
>
>
> We can be reflective about one's actions and conclude *for ourselve*
> that they are good, but lobianity prevents correct machine to
> communicate it to others *as such*, if only to prevent any normative
> use of a notion like "goodness". It prevents also idolatry toward names
> or descriptions of "good", "true", "correct". With comp a judge can put
> a machine in jail, despite its total inability to ever judge the
> machine deserve jail.
OK. That comports with my thought that good/bad are personal. So one can say, "I did that because I think it was good to do so." And I can try to persuade you that you should think it good too. It's just wrong to assume that there is a knowable, objective "good".
>
> Some buddhist told this in some provocative way: if you really love
> buddha, kill it. (Not to take literally OC).
>
> Recall that once we interview a correct machine, be it Peano-Arithmetic
> PA, or the far richer Zermelo-Fraenkel, or even the "angel"
> Analysis+OmegaRule (which has infinite cognitive abilities), the first
> interesting thing such machines or entity say is that they will told us
> some bullshit or that they may told us some bullshit. So am I. Please,
> don't infer from that that I believe to be such a *correct* machine
> (that does not follow logically). I know "I" am lobian, assuming comp
> or (much) weaker. I don't know (and will never known) if I am
> consistent and I still less know if I am correct.
>
> Bruno
Yes, I understand and agree with that. But you are using "know" in an absolute sense. In the everyday sense of uncertain, but probably correct belief, one can know many things - though of course not that one is consistent.
Brent Meeker
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Received on Tue Dec 19 2006 - 15:33:23 PST