On Sun, Dec 10, 2006 at 01:57:40AM -0800, William wrote:
>
> > It takes precisely the same amount of information to simulate
> > something as the thing has in the first place. This is the definition
> > of information as used in algorithmic information theory. So I don't
> > think this latter argument works at all.
>
> I am referring to a perfect simulation by "higher hand". The universe
> where this simulation is taking place would both have all the
> information of our universe (same amount of information) + the
> information to describe the simulators ("higher hand"); which would be
> more than the information in our universe (and describing these higher
> hands probably isn't going to work without adding an infinite amount of
> information).
>
If the universe is computationallu simulable, then any universal
Turing machine will do for a "higher hand". In which case, the
information needed is simply the shortest possible program for
simulating the universe, the length of which by definition is the
information content of the universe.
If, on the other hand, the universe is not simulable by a Turing
machine, then I really don't know what you mean by simulating it by a
higher hand. You would need to give more details.
Cheers
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpcoder.domain.name.hidden
Australia
http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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Received on Mon Dec 11 2006 - 03:35:15 PST