Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> Bruno Marchal writes:
>
>> <snip>
>>
>>> We can assume that the structural difference makes a difference to
>>> consciousness but
>>> not external behaviour. For example, it may cause spectrum reversal.
>>
>> Let us suppose you are right. This would mean that there is
>> substitution level such that the digital copy person would act AS IF
>> she has been duplicated at the correct level, but having or living a
>> (1-person) spectrum reversal.
>>
>> Now what could that mean? Let us interview the copy and ask her the
>> color of the sky. Having the same external behavior as the original,
>> she will told us the usual answer: blue (I suppose a sunny day!).
>>
>> So, apparently she is not 1-aware of that spectrum reversal. This means
>> that from her 1-person point of view, there was no spectrum reversal,
>> but obviously there is no 3-description of it either ....
>>
>> So I am not sure your assertion make sense. I agree that if we take an
>> incorrect substitution level, the copy could experience a spectrum
>> reversal, but then the person will complain to her doctor saying
>> something like "I have not been copied correctly", and will not pay her
>> doctor bill (but this is a different external behaviour, ok?)
>
> I don't doubt that there is some substitution level that preserves 3rd person
> behaviour and 1st person experience, even if this turns out to mean copying
> a person to the same engineering tolerances as nature has specified for ordinary
> day to day life. The question is, is there some substitution level which preserves
> 3rd person behaviour but not 1st person experience? For example, suppose
> you carried around with you a device which monitored all your behaviour in great
> detail, created predictive models, compared its predictions with your actual
> behaviour, and continuously refined its models. Over time, this device might be
> able to mimic your behaviour closely enough such that it could take over control of
> your body from your brain and no-one would be able to tell that the substitution
> had occurred. I don't think it would be unreasonable to wonder whether this copy
> experiences the same thing when it looks at the sky and declares it to be blue as
> you do before the substitution.
That's a precis of Greg Egan's short story "The Jewel". I wouldn't call it unreasonable to wonder whether the copy experiences the same qualia, but I'd call it unreasonable to conclude that it did not on the stated evidence. In fact I find it hard to think of what evidence would count against it have some kind of qualia.
Brent Meeker
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Received on Fri Dec 01 2006 - 14:17:33 PST