Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> Colin Hales writes:
>
>>> I think it is logically possible to have functional equivalence but
>>> structural
>>> difference with consequently difference in conscious state even though
>>> external behaviour is the same.
>>>
>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>> Remember Dave Chalmers with his 'silicon replacement' zombie papers? (a)
>> Replace every neuron with a silicon "functional equivalent" and (b) hold
>> the external behaviour identical.
>
> I would guess that such a 1-for-1 replacement brain would in fact have the same
> PC as the biological original, although this si not a logical certainty. But what I was
> thinking of was the equivalent of copying the "look and feel" of a piece of software
> without having access to the source code. Computers may one day be able to copy
> the "look and feel" of a human not by directly modelling neurons but by completely
> different mechanisms. Even if such computers were conscious, there seems no good
> reason to assume that their experiences would be similar to those of a similarly
> behaving human.
>
>> If the 'structural difference' (accounting for consciousness) has a
>> critical role in function then the assumption of identical external
>> behaviour is logically flawed. This is the 'philosophical zombie'. Holding
>> the behaviour to be the same is a meaninglesss impossibility in this
>> circumstance.
>
> We can assume that the structural difference makes a difference to consciousness but
> not external behaviour. For example, it may cause spectrum reversal.
>
>> In the case of Chalmers silicon replacement it assumes that everything
>> that was being done by the neuron is duplicated. What the silicon model
>> assumes is a) that we know everything there is to know and b) that silicon
>> replacement/modelling/representation is capable of delivering everything,
>> even if we did 'know everything' and put it in the model. Bad, bad,
>> arrogant assumptions.
>
> Well, it might just not work, and you end up with an idiot who slobbers and stares into
> space. Or you might end up with someone who can do calculations really well but displays
> no emotions. But it's a thought experiment: suppose you use whatever advanced technology
> it takes to create a being with *exactly* the same behaviours as a biological human. Can
> you be sure that this being would be conscious? Can you be sure that this being would be
> conscious in the same way you and I are conscious?
Consciousness would be supported by the behavioral evidence. If it were functionally similar at a low level I don't see what evidence there would be against it. So the best conclusion would be that the being was conscious.
If we knew a lot about the function of the human brain and we created this behaviorally identical being but with different functional structure; then we would have some evidence against the being having human type consciousness - but I think we'd be able to assert that it was not conscious in some way.
Brent Meeker
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Received on Wed Nov 29 2006 - 01:01:38 PST