Re: UDA revisited

From: David Nyman <>
Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2006 14:01:01 -0000

1Z wrote:

> But PC isn't *extra* information It is a re-presentation of
> what is coming in through the senses by 3rd person mechanisms.

How can you be confident of that? We can see that transactional
information arrives in the brain and is processed in a 3-person
describable manner. We don't have the glimmer of a theory of how this
could of itself produce anything remotely like PC, or indeed more
fundamentally account for the existence of any non-3-personal 'pov'
whatsoever. What I'm suggesting is that 'phenomenality' is inherently
bound up with instantiation, and that it thereby embodies (literally)
information that is inaccessible from the 3-person (i.e. disembodied)
pov. This is why 'qualia' aren't 'out there'. Of course this doesn't
imply that electrons are conscious or whatever, because the typical
content and 'grasp' of PC would emerge at vastly higher-order levels of
organisation. But my point is that *instantiation* makes the difference
- the world looks *like* something (actually, like *me*) to an
instantiated entity, but not like anything (obviously) to a
non-instantiated entity.

PZs, as traditionally conceived, are precisely that - non-instantiated,
abstract, and hence not 'like' anything at all. The difference between
a PZ and a traditionally-duplicated PC human is that we *can't help*
but get the phenomenality when we follow the traditional process of
constructing people. But a purely 3-person functional theory doesn't
tell us how. And consequently we can't find a purely functional
*substitution level* that is guaranteed to produce PC, except by
physical duplication. Or - as in the 'yes doctor' gamble - by observing
the behaviour of the entity and drawing our own conclusions.


> David Nyman wrote:
> > For this to be what is producing PC, the instantiating, or
> > constitutive, level must be providing whatever information is necessary
> > to 'animate' 3-person transactional 'data' in phenomenal form, and in
> > addition whatever processes are contingent on phenomenally-animated
> > perception must be causally effective at the 3-person level (if we are
> > to believe that possessing PC actually makes a difference). This seems
> > a bit worrying in terms of the supposed inadmissability of 'hidden
> > variables' in QM (i.e the transactional theory of reality).
> But PC isn't *extra* information It is a re-presentation of
> what is coming in through the senses by 3rd person mechanisms.

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Received on Tue Nov 28 2006 - 09:01:19 PST

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