Quentin Anciaux writes:
> But the point is to assume this "nonsense" to take a "conclusion", to see
> where it leads. Why imagine a "possible" zombie which is functionnally
> identical if there weren't any dualistic view in the first place ! Only in
> dualistic framework it is possible to imagine a functionnally equivalent to
> human yet lacking consciousness, the other way is that functionnally
> equivalence *requires* consciousness (you can't have functionnally
> equivalence without consciousness).
I think it is logically possible to have functional equivalence but structural
difference with consequently difference in conscious state even though
external behaviour is the same.
Stathis Papaioannou
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Received on Mon Nov 27 2006 - 18:00:53 PST