Re: UDA revisited

From: Colin Geoffrey Hales <c.hales.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2006 10:38:06 +1100 (EST)

>
> Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
>>> But you have no way to know whether phenomenal scenes are created by a
>>> particular computer/robot/program or not because it's just mystery
>>> property defined as whatever creates phenomenal scenes. You're going
>>> around in circles. At some point you need to anchor your theory to an
>>> operational definition.
>>
>> OK. There is a proven mystery calle dthe hard problem. Documented to
>> death
>> and beyond.
>
> It is discussed in documents - but it is not "documented" and it is not
> proven.

It's enshrined in encylopedias! yes it's a problem We don;t know. It was
#2 in "big questions" in science mag last year.

> It is predicted (by Bruno to take a nearby example) that a
> physical system that replicates the functions of a human (or dog) brain at
> the level of neural activity and receives will implement phenomenal
> consciousness.

Then the proposition should be able to say exactly where, why and how. It
can't, it hasn't.

>> ....is that the physics (rule set) of appearances and the physics (rule
>> set) of the universe capable of generating appearances are not the same
>> rule set! That the universe is NOT made of its appearance, it's made of
>> something _with_ an appearance that is capable of making an appearance
>> generator.
>
> It is a commonplace that the ontology of physics may be mistaken (that's
> how science differs from religion) and hence one can never be sure that
> his theory refers to what's really real - but that's the best bet.

Yes but in order that you be mistaken you have to be aware you have made a
mistake, which means admitting you have missed something. The existence of
an apparently unsolvable problem... isn;t that a case for that kind of
behaviour? (see below to see what science doesn't know it doesn't know
about itself)

>
>>
>> That's it. Half the laws of physics are going neglected merely because
>> we
>> won't accept phenomenal consciousness ITSELF as evidence of anything.
>
> We accept it as evidence of extremely complex neural activity - can you
> demonstrate it is not?

You have missed the point again.

a) We demand CONTENTS OF phenomenal consciousness (that which is
perceived) as all scientific evidence.

but

B) we do NOT accept phenomenal consciousness ITSELF, "perceiving" as
scientific evidence of anything.

Evidence (a) is impotent to explain (b). Empirical fact - 2500 of total
failure. So, why not allow ourselves the luxury of exploring candidate
physics of underlying realities that appears to provide phenomenal
consciousness in the way that we have? Indeed more than that...such that
it also makes the universe look like it does when we do science on it
using it = (a)? A very tight constraint. Phenomenality is the evidence
source for 2 sets of descrptions not one - both equalliy empirically
supported.

If we accepted (B) as evidence we'd be doing this already. We don't. We're
missing half the picture.

Colin Hales





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Received on Sun Nov 26 2006 - 18:40:16 PST

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