Le Dimanche 26 Novembre 2006 22:54, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit :
<SNIP>
> What point is there in bothering with it. The philosophical zombie is
> ASSUMED to be equivalent! This is failure before you even start! It's
> wrong and it's proven wrong because there is a conclusively logically and
> empirically provable function that the zombie cannot possibly do without
> phenomenality: SCIENCE. The philosophical zombie would have to know
> everything a-priori, which makes science meaningless. There is no novelty
> to a philosophical zombie. It would have to anticipate all forms of
> randomness or chaotic behaviour.... NUTS.
But that's exactly what all the arguments is about !! Either identical
functionnal behavior entails consciousness either there is some magical
property needed plus identical functionnal behavior to entails
consciousness.
> This is failure before you even start!
But the point is to assume this "nonsense" to take a "conclusion", to see
where it leads. Why imagine a "possible" zombie which is functionnally
identical if there weren't any dualistic view in the first place ! Only in
dualistic framework it is possible to imagine a functionnally equivalent to
human yet lacking consciousness, the other way is that functionnally
equivalence *requires* consciousness (you can't have functionnally
equivalence without consciousness).
> This is failure before you even start!
That's what you're doing... you haven't prove that zombie can't do science
because the "zombie" point is not on what they can do or not, it is the fact
that either acting like we act (human way) entails necessarily to have
consciousness or it does not (meaning that there exists an extra property
beyond behavior, an extra thing undetectable from seeing/living/speaking/...
with the "zombie" that gives rise to consciousness)L.
You haven't prove that zombie can't do science because you tells it at the
starting of the argument. The argument should be weither or not it is
possible to have a *complete* *functionnal* (human) replica yet lacking
consciousness.
Quentin
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Received on Sun Nov 26 2006 - 17:37:14 PST