Re: UDA revisited

From: 1Z <peterdjones.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Sun, 26 Nov 2006 12:44:19 -0800

Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Hi,
> Le Dimanche 26 Novembre 2006 12:43, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit :
> > Note: Scientists, by definition:
> > a) are doing science on the world external to them
> > b) inhabit a universe of exquisite novelty
> > ...or there'd be no need for them!
> Please note: Zombies by definition:
> a) are functionnaly equivalent to what you called 'scientists'.
> b) are undistinguishable from what you called 'scientists', because if they
> were it would be a property that would easily discriminate them.
>
> The zombie point is a I'll say one more time a point to show non-sense in
> dualistic view... what it means is either that a property of the natural/real
> world is not copiable/replicable and that copying all physical/computational
> properties is not enough, there is still left the PC(what you call phenomenal
> consciousness which could be shorten to consciousness) which discriminate
> zombie from the scientist.
>
> Taking your point is this:
>
> Definition:
>
> Zombie can't do science because they don't have PC.
> Scientist can do science because they have PC
>
> Conclusion:
>
> Zombie can't do science because they don't have PC.
> So zombie can't be a scientist.
I think his premiss is:
PC is a function.
>From that alone it follows that you can't have
zombies, but zombies must be functional duplicated, but, in lacking
PC, they would lack a function. So they would both be functionally
identical and functionally different -- reductio ad absurdum.
But the premiss is arbitrary
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Received on Sun Nov 26 2006 - 15:46:22 PST

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