Re: UDA revisited

From: Colin Geoffrey Hales <c.hales.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Sun, 26 Nov 2006 22:26:35 +1100 (EST)

>
> But you have no way to know whether phenomenal scenes are created by a
> particular computer/robot/program or not because it's just mystery
> property defined as whatever creates phenomenal scenes. You're going
> around in circles. At some point you need to anchor your theory to an
> operational definition.

OK. There is a proven mystery calle dthe hard problem. Documented to death
and beyond. Call it Physics X. It is the physics that _predicts_ (NOT
DESCRIBES) phenomenal consciousness (PC). We have, through all my fiddling
about with scientists, conclusive scientific evidence PC exists and is
necessary for science.

So what next?

You say to yourself... "none of the existing laws of physics predict PC.
Therefore my whole conception of how I understand the universe
scientifically must be missing something fundamental. Absolutely NONE of
what we know is part of it. What could that be?".

Then you let yourself have the freedom to explore that possibiltiy. For the
answer to is which you seek.

The answer?

....is that the physics (rule set) of appearances and the physics (rule
set) of the universe capable of generating appearances are not the same
rule set! That the universe is NOT made of its appearance, it's made of
something _with_ an appearance that is capable of making an appearance
generator.

That's it. Half the laws of physics are going neglected merely because we
won't accept phenomenal consciousness ITSELF as evidence of anything.

> If you try to make doing unique science the
> operational test, then you've defined 90% of humans and 100% of dogs,
> chimps, cats, etc. to be zombies.

Nope. I have merely defined them not to be scientists. That's all. Science
is merely special enough to allow conclusive testing. That's all I need to
do.

Cheers

Colin Hales




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Received on Sun Nov 26 2006 - 06:27:07 PST

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