Le 24-nov.-06, à 05:48, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit :
> I agree very 'not interesting' ... a bit like saying "assuming comp"
> endlessly.....and never being able to give it teeth.
I guess you don't know about my work (thesis). I know there are some
"philosopher" who considers it controversial, but it is not a work in
philosophy (in the current usage in europa at least) and nothing in it
is "third person" controversed actually (to my knowledge). Comp makes
the physical science emerging from number theory, and I show how to
make the derivation constructively, by interviewing an arithmetically
sound "platonist" universal machine. The term "platonist" can be used
in the formal sense that the machine asserts (A v ~A) for any
arithmetical propositions.
And this makes comp (actually a weaker form of comp) empirically
falsifiable.
>
> ... I am more interested in proving scientists aren't/can't be
> zombies....that it seems to also challenge computationalism in a
> certain
> sense... this is a byproduct I can't help, not the central issue.
I can have a lot of sympathy for an argument showing that science
cannot be done without consciousness (I personaly do believe this!).
But if the byproduct is that machine cannot be conscious, then I think
it will make your argument far less interesting, and, by Church thesis,
necessarily non effective (if it was a machine would be able to produce
it).
Actually, the acomp hypostases can already been used to explain why
machines will develop argument why their own consciousness are special
and cannot be attached to any describable machine in a provable way
(and they will be 1-correct!!!).
It is the diabolical (somehow godelian) prediction of comp: machines
will not believe in comp, just bet on it in some circumstance.
In a preceding post you wrote:
>>
>> Bruno: I would separate completely "computations" which is an
>> absolute notion
>> (at least with Church thesis), and "proof" which has sense only
>> relatively to the choice of a formal system, or theory, or machine.
>>
>
> OK. It tend to mix them without thinking...The process is mixed in my
> mind. It could be because I can see reality as a formal system.
The distinction between computability and provability is fundamental
for the AUDA. Alas, you are not the only one who miss the distinction,
but explanation of this has to be a bit more technical. I have already
attempted some explanation, but it is perhaps too hard to convey in a
non technical list. I don't know, presently.
Now, seeing reality as a formal system ? that does not make sense for
me. Arithmetical reality is already beyond all formal systems except
infinite "divine" one like the An-omega angels (which in their
analytical context suffer the same limitations, and obeys too to G and
G*, cf Boolos 93).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Received on Sat Nov 25 2006 - 08:40:10 PST