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From: Colin Geoffrey Hales <c.hales.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Sun, 19 Nov 2006 13:33:13 +1100 (EST)

<snip>

*> Since it makes no difference in any observable respect whether we are
*

living in a computer simulation running on a bare substrate, as one that

is incidently computated as part of a universal dovetailer, or an

infinite chain of dovetailers, we really can make use of Laplace's ripost

to Napoleon "Sire, I have no need of that hypothesis" with

respect to a concrete computer running our world.

<snip>

Sorry Russel, I disagree with this claim.

To say that the universe is computation does not imply any old substitute

computed abstraction will be identical in all respects.

In particular there is a blizzard of virtual theorems made available

because of the intrinsic parallelism of 'reality as computation'. These

are NOT explictly computed. Abstract it and all the virtual

theorems/computations are gone.

To see a computational equivalent check out ANY cellular automaton. There

is a perfectly computational but uncomputed relationship between any cell

and _all_ other cells (NOT just the local cells explicit to the rule set

used). Yet the only thing that was actually computed was the cell contents

using local cells incorporated in the cell rules. The universe is

equivalent. It is computation and can be regarded/treated as a massively

parallel CA. All the virtual theorems (computations) actually exist.

So: Computationalism is the statement that "I am a computation".

.... is correct in that the universe is computation, but incorrect in that

an abstraction on a substrate will replicate everything - is cannot/does

not replicate the virtual theorems. SO.....I have shown you a _physical_

but virtual computation that is NOT replicated by the UDA abstraction.

This makes your original assertion incorrect.

The story is bigger than this in that I hold the virtual theorems to be

the substrate for subjective experience....but my claims in this regard do

not affect my treatment of your claim in respect of computationalism. The

UDA throws away a very very very large number of virtual theorems. The

UDA does NOT do massively parallel theorem proving therefore it loses all

the virtual theorems. Note that a massively parallel computer made of

STUFF does NOT recreate the virtual theorems inherent in the actual

computation that _is_ STUFF.

Put it this way....TWO theorem-proofs actually deliver THREE truths.

TRUTH_1, TRUTH_2 and the difference between the two. Traverse TRUTH_1 back

down to the common axiom set and then back up TRUTH_2. This corresponds to

'as-if' a direct TRUTH_1_to_2 or TRUTH_2_to_1 was enacted/proven when it

was not actually proven explicitly. It comes about because TRUTH_1 and

TRUTH_2 were 'computed' in parallel by the universe-as-computation. If the

universe is computation and computes matter then the virtual theorems are

'virtual matter'.

This is the literal origin of Godel's incompleteness theorem! It's _why_

it applies - the parallelness of theorem proving is neglected by

mathematicians in the construction of calculus/logic. In the process a

whole pile of theorems become true but unprovable or conversely there's a

whole pile of truths that are provable but not actually proven, but can be

implicitly proven (via the method of 'virtual theorem proving' shown

above.

So... if the UDA is an abstration made of 'STUFF' then it has no virtual

theorems whereas the STUFF has them. A UDA made of anything else but STUFF

is meaningless from my point of view. I want to build real AGI, not play

in ideal realms (no matter how much fun it is!).

If I can get this EC/lambda calc thing sorted I'd be able to show you

formally. All in good time.

regards,

Colin Hales

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Received on Sat Nov 18 2006 - 21:33:44 PST

Date: Sun, 19 Nov 2006 13:33:13 +1100 (EST)

<snip>

living in a computer simulation running on a bare substrate, as one that

is incidently computated as part of a universal dovetailer, or an

infinite chain of dovetailers, we really can make use of Laplace's ripost

to Napoleon "Sire, I have no need of that hypothesis" with

respect to a concrete computer running our world.

<snip>

Sorry Russel, I disagree with this claim.

To say that the universe is computation does not imply any old substitute

computed abstraction will be identical in all respects.

In particular there is a blizzard of virtual theorems made available

because of the intrinsic parallelism of 'reality as computation'. These

are NOT explictly computed. Abstract it and all the virtual

theorems/computations are gone.

To see a computational equivalent check out ANY cellular automaton. There

is a perfectly computational but uncomputed relationship between any cell

and _all_ other cells (NOT just the local cells explicit to the rule set

used). Yet the only thing that was actually computed was the cell contents

using local cells incorporated in the cell rules. The universe is

equivalent. It is computation and can be regarded/treated as a massively

parallel CA. All the virtual theorems (computations) actually exist.

So: Computationalism is the statement that "I am a computation".

.... is correct in that the universe is computation, but incorrect in that

an abstraction on a substrate will replicate everything - is cannot/does

not replicate the virtual theorems. SO.....I have shown you a _physical_

but virtual computation that is NOT replicated by the UDA abstraction.

This makes your original assertion incorrect.

The story is bigger than this in that I hold the virtual theorems to be

the substrate for subjective experience....but my claims in this regard do

not affect my treatment of your claim in respect of computationalism. The

UDA throws away a very very very large number of virtual theorems. The

UDA does NOT do massively parallel theorem proving therefore it loses all

the virtual theorems. Note that a massively parallel computer made of

STUFF does NOT recreate the virtual theorems inherent in the actual

computation that _is_ STUFF.

Put it this way....TWO theorem-proofs actually deliver THREE truths.

TRUTH_1, TRUTH_2 and the difference between the two. Traverse TRUTH_1 back

down to the common axiom set and then back up TRUTH_2. This corresponds to

'as-if' a direct TRUTH_1_to_2 or TRUTH_2_to_1 was enacted/proven when it

was not actually proven explicitly. It comes about because TRUTH_1 and

TRUTH_2 were 'computed' in parallel by the universe-as-computation. If the

universe is computation and computes matter then the virtual theorems are

'virtual matter'.

This is the literal origin of Godel's incompleteness theorem! It's _why_

it applies - the parallelness of theorem proving is neglected by

mathematicians in the construction of calculus/logic. In the process a

whole pile of theorems become true but unprovable or conversely there's a

whole pile of truths that are provable but not actually proven, but can be

implicitly proven (via the method of 'virtual theorem proving' shown

above.

So... if the UDA is an abstration made of 'STUFF' then it has no virtual

theorems whereas the STUFF has them. A UDA made of anything else but STUFF

is meaningless from my point of view. I want to build real AGI, not play

in ideal realms (no matter how much fun it is!).

If I can get this EC/lambda calc thing sorted I'd be able to show you

formally. All in good time.

regards,

Colin Hales

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Received on Sat Nov 18 2006 - 21:33:44 PST

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