Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 30-oct.-06, à 14:15, Stathis Papaioannou wrote (in part):
>
>
> > A computationalist would add that a computer analogue
> > of a person would also have the same mental states, but this is more
> > controversial.
>
>
> Is it really? With the notable couragous exception of Penrose I don't
> know people who object to comp.
Hardly anyone thinks it is a good explanation of phenomenality/qualia.
Computationalists tend to be people who care a lot more about
thinking than feeeling.
> Of course someone like Searle could gives the feeling that he dislike
> comp, but its own reasoning, if you read it carefully, proves that he
> accept comp, albeit only for low substitution level unlike most
> "functionalist".
Another staunch opponent is Edelmann.
http://dangerousintersection.org/?p=178
'The notion that the brain is a kind of computer is an error of such
magnitude, Mr. Edelman believes,
that cognitive science is on the brink of a crisis. "I claim," he
writes, "that the entire structure on which
the cognitivist enterprise is based is incoherent and not borne out by
the facts.'
> Now as you know comp is my working hypothesis so this is for me just a
> bit out of my topic. Remember that for postulating "not-comp" you have
> to introduce high infinities in the third person description of the
> brain/body.
No you don't. You can posit that phenomenality inheres directly
in matter, or that matter otherwise pins downs an absolute
level of simulation.
> In particular you have to abandon QM, or any theory ever
> proposed in physics and cognitive science.
No theory of physics entails that simulations will have
all the features -- other than functional/structural
ones -- of the systems simulated.
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Received on Tue Oct 31 2006 - 13:02:21 PST