Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted

From: Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Thu, 26 Oct 2006 16:15:00 +0200

Le 23-oct.-06, à 14:29, 1Z a écrit :

>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Le 20-oct.-06, à 17:04, 1Z a écrit :
>>
>>> As usual, the truth of a mathematical existence-claim does not
>>> prove Platonism.
>>
>> By Platonism, or better "arithmetical realism" I just mean the belief
>> by many mathematician in the non constructive proof of "OR"
>> statements.
>
> So where is the UD running? If Platonia doesn't exist,
> how can I be in it?



You miss the point. For asserting that the UD exists, I don't even
need to use the non-constructive OR. The UD exists for an intuitionist
as well.
("exists" in the same sense that it exists a number which is not the
sum of three squares (x = 7 for example).

I think that in many of your last posts you are begging the point. You
seem to assume the existence of a physical universe, then you define
"existence" by existing in the physical universe. I don't assume a
physical universe. I define existence by the arithmetical truth of
existential sentences. Then I explain in all (technical thus) details
why immaterial machines/numbers come to feel, perceive, know, believe
in sharable quanta and unsharable qualia.

You say somewhere that we see matter. I think that this is the main
difference between you and me, and I would say between Aristotle and
Plato: Aristotle (like St-Thomas) argues indeed in his metaphysics that
what we see and measure is what really exist (so that we can sleep in
peace). Plato and actually most (rational) mystics (from Pythagorus to
St-Augustin) try to explain that what we see could as well be only the
shadows of the shadows of the shadows of the shadows ... of what
perhaps is (so that we have to keep our vigilance and our skepticism or
our doubting abilities in front of *all* theories (especially including
those who could have been built in by long evolutionary processes).

All what I say is that (standard) computationalism is epistemologically
incompatible with materialism. It *is* a necessary-redundancy argument:
even if matter exists, standard comp makes it impossible to use for
justifying any stable belief. That is the conclusion of the UDA. The
AUDA makes it constructive and can generate the physical laws
completely (making comp or acomp 100% scientific (popper-testable).
It remain possible that the translation of UDA in arithmetic is to
rough, and that is why I say "comp or acomp". But until now, empirical
physics seems to confirm all the "weird" prediction of (a)comp.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Received on Thu Oct 26 2006 - 10:37:52 PDT

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