Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted

From: 1Z <peterdjones.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Wed, 25 Oct 2006 11:16:56 -0700

David Nyman wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>
> > The problem is not that there would be gaps, the problem
> > is that they would all be conscious simultaneously.
>
> Peter, I know from the above and previous comments you have made that
> this notion of multiple compresent consciousness seems to you to
> contradict your own experience, but I just can't see why. The crucial
> point about our 1-person experience is that it's inherently
> informationally self-limiting - i.e. we can only define ourselves in
> terms of whatever information we have access to from a given pov.

Why are POV's divided temporally?. If the BU theory predicts that they
are not, it must be rejected.

> And
> surely this is what prevents us from having the kind of 'multiple'
> experiences you have in mind. In fact, it illustrates the fundamental
> intension of the indexical term 'I' - other 'versions' of ourselves,
> informationally separated temporally and/or spatially, could equally
> validly be considered clones from any given 'present' pov.

I don't see how POV's can be logically prior
to a space time structure.

> This is why
> I have previously been so insistent about the 'global' nature of the
> 1-person (although I know this has led to terminological confusion).
> Its 'globality' consists in the fact that *any* suitably constituted
> region of reality equally partakes of this self-referential experience
> of 'I'.
> But the *content* of each 1-person OM is inherently limited by
> its information content. Doesn't this image do the trick for you?
>
> > > All I know is what I am
> > > experiencing *now*.
> >
> > Yes. That is the phenomenological fact that contradicts the BU.
>
> But it doesn't. What do you think you would experience in a BU
> (focusing on the presence of observer moments, rather than the A-series
> versus B-series issue)?

A consciousness spread across time.

> What process exists that could coherently
> totalise or synthesise in some way the informationally separated OMs?

The question is what could make the conscious one-at-a-time
if not the flow of time.

> You might as well say that you and I should somehow have overlapping
> consciousness right now.

We *do* have simultaneous consciousness -- just not
the same consciousness.

> Well, we don't, because we have different
> information horizons - and just *this much* information crosses these
> barriers to become part of our joint conciousness. I think the analogy
> is pretty direct.

My future selves will contain information from my
present self. But they are not conscious *yet*.


> David
>
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > > Peter Jones writes:
> > >
> > > > > > The other issue matter is able to explain as a result of having no
> > > > > > properties of its own is the issue of change and time. For change to be
> > > > > > distinguishable from mere succession, it must be change in something.
> > > > > > It could be a contingent natural law that certain properties never
> > > > > > change. However, with a propertiless substrate, it becomes a logical
> > > > > > necessity that the substrate endures through change; since all changes
> > > > > > are changes in properties, a propertiless substrate cannot itself
> > > > > > change and must endure through change. In more detail here
> > > > >
> > > > > Why must "change... be change in something"? It sort of sounds reasonable
> > > > > but it is our duty to question every assumption and weed out the superfluous
> > > > > ones. If there is an object with (space, time, colour) coordinates (x1, t1, red)
> > > > > and another object (x1, t2, orange), then we say that the object has changed
> > > > > from red to orange.
> > > >
> > > > If we already know what distinguishes the time co-ordinate
> > > > from the space co-ordinate. What is our usual
> > > > way of doing that? The time co-ordinate is the one that is always
> > > > changing...
> > > >
> > > > Time and Possibility
> > > >
> > > > Imagine a universe in which there was no change, nothing actually
> > > > occurs. In the absence of events, it would be imposssible to
> > > > distinguish any point in timw from any other point. There would be no
> > > > meaning to time -- such a universe would be timeless.
> > > > Now imagine a universe which is completely chaotic. Things change so
> > > > completely from one moment to the next that there are no conistent
> > > > things. This universe is made up solely of events, which can be
> > > > labelled with 4 coordinates . [ x,y,z,t]. But which coordinate is the
> > > > time coordinate ? One could just as well say [ y,t,z,x]. In the absence
> > > > of persistent ojects there is nothing to single out time as a
> > > > 'direction' in a coordinate system. So again time is meaingless.
> > > >
> > > > In order to have a meaningful Time, you need a combination of sameness
> > > > (persisitent objects) and change (events). So time is posited on being
> > > > able to say:
> > > >
> > > > "Object A changed from state S1 at time T1 to state S2 at time T2."
> > >
> > > You're just stating that time is different from space. Time and space are also
> > > different from colour, or any other property an object may have. If we didn't
> > > have time there would be no change, if we didn't have height everything would
> > > be flat, and if we didn't have colour everything would be black.
> >
> > But it isn't an arbitrary difference.
> >
> > > > > I don't see how a physical multiverse would be distinguishable from a virtual
> > > > > reality or a mathematical reality (assuming the latter is possible, for the sake
> > > > > of this part of the argument). The successive moments of your conscious
> > > > > experience do not need to be explicitly linked together to "flow" and they do
> > > > > not need to be explicitly separated, either in separate universes or in separate
> > > > > rooms, to be separate.
> > > >
> > > > I've never seen an HP universe. Yet they *must* exist in a mathematical
> > > > reality, because there are no random gaps in Platonia. Since all
> > > > mathematical
> > > > structures are exemplified, the structure corresponging to (me up till
> > > > 1 second ago)
> > > > + (purple dragons) must exist. If there is nothing
> > > > mathematical to keep out of HP universe, the fact that I have never
> > > > seen one is
> > > > evidence against a mathematical multiverse.
> > >
> > > That you don't experience HP universes is as much an argument against a physical
> > > multiverse as it is an argument against a mathematical multiverse.
> >
> > Not "as much". It depends on how constrained they are.
> > Physical multiverses can be almost as constrained as single universes,
> > or almost as unconstrained as multiverses.
> >
> > > If a physical MV
> > > exists, then in some branch you will encounter purple dragons in the next second.
> >
> > With a very low measure.
> >
> > > The fact that you don't means that either there is no physical multiverse or there is
> > > a physical multiverse but the purple dragon experience is of low measure. Similarly in
> > > a mathematical multiverse the HP experiences may be of low measure.
> >
> > Physical multiversalists can choose measure to match observation (that
> > is
> > basically how the SWE is arrived at). Mathematical multiversalists
> > cannot choose an arbitrary measure, because nothing is arbitrary or
> > contingnet
> > in Platonia. Measure has to emerge naturally and necessarily for them.
> >
> >
> > > > > If you died today and just by accident a possible next
> > > > > moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in the
> > > > > future, then ipso facto you would find yourself a trillion years in the future.
> > > >
> > > > That's the whole problem. I could just as easily find myself in an HP
> > > > universe. But I never do.
> > >
> > > Not "just as easily". If you are destructively scanned and a moment from now 2 copies
> > > of you are created in Moscow and 1 copy created in Washington, you have a 2/3 chance
> > > of finding yourself in Moscow and a 1/3 chance of finding yourself in Washington.
> >
> > What's that got to do with Platonia? Platonia contains every
> > configuration of matter.
> > (Snd no time). Configurations where I'm in Moscow, configurations where
> > I'm in Washington,
> > configurations where I'm on the moon, configurations where I'm in
> > Narnia.
> > There is no unaccountable fact to the effect that there is 1 copy of me
> > in Moscow,
> > 2 in Washington, and 0 on the moon. There are no random gaps in
> > Platonia.
> >
> > (That's the "mathematical* mutiverse of course. A physical mutliverse
> > is an entirely different matter).
> >
> > > It is a
> > > real problem to explain why the HP universes are less likely to be experienced than the
> > > orderly ones (see chapter 4.2 of Russell Standish' book for a summary of some of the
> > > debates on this issue), but it is not any more of a problem for a mathematical as opposed
> > > to a physical multiverse.
> >
> > Not at all. P-multiversalists can and do choose measure to match
> > observation.
> >
> > > > > But if you had the successive moments of your consciousness implemented
> > > > > in parallel, perhaps as a simulation on a powerful computer, it would be impossible
> > > > > to tell that this was the case. For all you are aware, there may not *be* any past
> > > > > moments: your present experience may include false memories of your past, and
> > > > > whole world may have been created a second ago.
> > > >
> > > > A simulation running on a computer is still a dynamic, temporal
> > > > process. The point is that the passage of
> > > > time tells me that I am not in Platonia.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Time Capsules: Getting Flow from Sequence.
> > > >
> > > > Proponents of the Block Universe view believe that there is only a
> > > > B-Series. Some think that alone is adequate to explain the subjective
> > > > Flow-of-Time. It is easy enough to see how there could be a sequence in
> > > > the B series. If we consider a series of 3 dimensional "snapshots" of
> > > > someone's brain, each subsequent snapshot iwll contain information
> > > > relating back to previous ones.
> > > > But is this chain or sequence enough to establish flow ? A B-series
> > > > without an A-series is like a spatial series. If you had a series of
> > > > clones arranged spatially so that clone 2 has all of clone 1's memories
> > > > (and more), clone 3 has all of clone 2's memories (and more) and so on,
> > > > you would not expect anything to be flowing from one clone to another.
> > > > The clones form a series of "time capsules", and a such they have a
> > > > natural sequence, but that is all.
> > > > Without an A series, there is nothing to justify the idea that only one
> > > > time capsule is conscious "at a time". Either they all are, or none
> > > > are. We know we are conscious, so we must reject the "none are" option.
> > > > The Block Universe therefore predicts that all time capsules are
> > > > conscious. This is in line with the way the Block Universe spatialises
> > > > Time. It predicts that consciousness is a single 4-dimensional entity.
> > > > I would not just be conscious now with memories of the past, I would
> > > > have a consciousness in the past overlaid on my present consciousness.
> > >
> > > Whether the Block Universe model is right or not, the series of clones you
> > > describe, set up as an experiment, would still give the experience of being
> > > continuously conscious through time.
> >
> > The problem is not that there would be gaps, the problem
> > is that they would all be conscious simultaneously.
> >
> > > I remember being conscious a second
> > > ago but how could I possibly know that I didn't just pop into existence
> > > complete with false memories half a second ago?
> >
> > That isn't the problem. The problem is that if time is just like
> > space, as the BU theory states, you should have single consciousness
> > spread across time, not a temporal sequence of one-at-a-time
> > conscious states.
> >
> > > All I know is what I am
> > > experiencing *now*.
> >
> > Yes. That is the phenomenological fact that contradicts the BU.
> >
> > > It is only because I have memories and a sense of being
> > > the same person over time that I consider it was "I" who woke up this morning
> > > and it will be "I" again who goes to bed tonight. I don't have a direct telepathic
> > > link to past or future selves, or copies in the next room, to ensure that they are
> > > "really me". All I have to go on are my present memories and beliefs, which could
> > > in theory be artificially implanted without changing anything about my stream of
> > > consciousness. Nothing is changed if we say that we live only transiently, and the
> > > feeling that we persist as individuals through time is an illusion.
> > >
> >
> >
> >
> > > Stathis Papaioannou
> > > _________________________________________________________________
> > > Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail.
> > > http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d


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Received on Wed Oct 25 2006 - 14:19:53 PDT

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