Tom Caylor wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
> > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > > Le 23-oct.-06, à 15:58, David Nyman a écrit :
> > >
> > > >
> > > > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > > >
> > > >> Here I disagree, or if you want make that distinction (introduced by
> > > >> Peter), you can sum up the conclusion of the UD Argument by:
> > > >>
> > > >> Computationalism entails COMP.
> > > >
> > > > Bruno, could you distinguish between your remarks vis-a-vis comp, that
> > > > on the one hand: a belief in 'primary' matter can be retained provided
> > > > it is not invoked in the explanation of consciousness,
> > >
> > >
> > > Imagine someone who has been educated during his entire childhood with
> > > the idea that anything moving on the road with wheels is pulled by
> > > invisible horses. Imagine then that becoming an adult he decides to
> > > study physics and thermodynamics, and got the understanding that there
> > > is no need to postulate invisible horses for explaining how car moves
> > > around.
> > > Would this "proves" the non existence of invisible horses? Of course
> > > no. From a logical point of view you can always add irrefutable
> > > hypotheses making some theories as redundant as you wish. The
> > > thermodynamician can only say that he does not need the invisible
> > > horses hypothesis for explaining the movement of the cars , like
> > > Laplace said to Napoleon that he does not need the "God hypothesis" in
> > > his mechanics. And then he is coherent as far as he does not use the
> > > God concept in is explanation.
> >
> > The analogy isn't analogous. It is actually the
> > Platonic numbers that are the invisible horses.
> > No-one has ever seen a Platonic object. The "vehicle"
> > of mathematics is driven by the "engine" of mathematicians,
> > chalk, blackboards, computers etc -- all material.
> >
> >
> > > The comp hypothesis, which I insist is the same as standard
> > > computationalism (but put in a more precise way if only because of the
> > > startling consequences) entails that "primary matter", even existing,
> > > cannot be used to justify anything related to the subjective
> > > experience, and this includes any *reading* of pointer needle result of
> > > a physical device. So we don't need the postulate it.
> > > And that is a good thing because the only definition of primary matter
> > > I know (the one by Aristotle in his metaphysics) is already refuted by
> > > both
> > > experiments and theory (QM or just comp as well).
> >
> > Of course QM does not refute materialism.
> >
> > > > and on the
> > > > other: that under comp 'matter' emerges from (what I've termed) a
> > > > recursively prior 1-person level. Why are these two conclusions not
> > > > contradictory?
> > >
> > >
> > > 'Matter', or the stable appearance of matter has to emerge from the
> > > "mathematical coherence of the computations".
> >
> > Which emerge from...?
> >
> > > This is what the UDA is
> > > supposed to prove. Scientifically it means that you can test comp by
> > > comparing some self-observing discourses of digital machines (those
> > > corresponding to the arithmetical translation of the UDA (AUDA)) with
> > > empirical physics. Again this cannot disprove the ("religious") belief
> > > in Matter, or in any Gods, for sure.
> >
> > The material world is visible, Platonia is not.
> >
> > > >> You will have to attach
> > > >> consciousness to actual material infinite.
> > > >
> > > > Why is this the case?
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Because it is a way to prevent the UDA reasoning (at least as currently
> > > exibited) to proceed. It makes sense to say that some actual material
> > > infinity is not duplicable, for example. To be sure, the AUDA would
> > > still work (but could be less well motivated).
> >
> > It makes sense to say that consciousness depends on levels
> > of emulation -- providing there is a 0-level pinned down by matter.
> >
> >
> > > Bruno
> > >
> > >
> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
> David and 1Z:
>
> How is exploring the Mandelbrot set through computation any different
> than exploring subatomic particles through computation (needed to
> successively approach the accuracies needed for the collisions in the
> linear accelerator)? Is not the only difference that in one case we
> have a priori labeled the object of study 'matter' and in the other
> case a 'set of numbers'? Granted, in the matter case we need more
> energy to explore, but couldn't this be simply from the sheer quantity
> of "number histories" we are dealing with compared to the Mandelbrot
> set?
>
> Tom
A number of recent developments in mathematics, such as the increased
use of computers to assist proof, and doubts about the correct choice
of basic axioms, have given rise to a view called quasi-empiricism.
This challenges the traditional idea of mathematical truth as eternal
and discoverable apriori. According to quasi-empiricists the use of a
computer to perform a proof is a form of experiment. But it remains the
case that any mathematical problem that can in principle be solved by
shutting you eye and thinking. Computers are used because mathematians
do not have infinite mental resources; they are an aid. Contrast this
with traditonal sciences like chemistry or biology, where real-world
objects have to be studied, and would still have to be studied by
super-scientitists with an IQ of a million. In genuinely emprical
sciences, experimentation and observation are used to gain information.
In mathematics the information of the solution to a problem is always
latent in the starting-point, the basic axioms and the formulation of
the problem. The process of thinking through a problem simply makes
this latent information explicit. (I say simply, but of ocurse it is
often very non-trivial). The use of a computer externalises this
process. The computer may be outside the mathematician's head but all
the information that comes out of it is information that went into it.
Mathematics is in that sense still apriori.
Having said that, the quasi-empricist still has some points about the
modern style of mathematics. Axioms look less like eternal truths and
mroe like hypotheses which are used for a while but may eventualy be
discarded if they prove problematical, like the role of scientific
hypotheses in Popper's philosophy.
Thus mathematics has some of the look and feel of empirical science
without being empricial in the most essential sense -- that of needing
an input of inormation from outside the head."Quasi" indeed!
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Received on Tue Oct 24 2006 - 12:34:30 PDT