1Z wrote:
> > 1) 'Computationalism', a theory (implicitly or explicitly) based on
> > materialism, although in a manner which (witness our recent dialogues),
> > at least so far as its putative association with consciousness is
> > concerned, in an entirely 'relational' manner which is extremely opaque
> > as to its roots in 'physical causality'.
>
> No, not entirely opaque.
Could you illuminate?
> Bruno uses 'comp' to mean the 'axiomatic base', not
> the conclusion.
Yes indeed, but the conclusions (e.g. the explanatory direction of
3-person <--> 1-person) are surely somewhat different?
David
> David Nyman wrote:
> > 1Z wrote:
> >
> > > Computationalism doesn't imply that. a conflict between
> > > computationalism and physicalism would be be astonshing
> > > and highly significant.
> >
> > It certainly would be astonishing to a 'physicalist'. But, as you have
> > remarked, our agenda here is more ecumenical.
> >
> > > A conflict between physicalsim and Platonism
> > > is much less so.
> >
> > Must I assume that by 'Platonism' here you mean COMP?
>
> Bruno's versions of COMP must embed Platonism (passim)
>
> > We do need, I
> > think, to make a clear distinction in these discussions between
> >
> > 1) 'Computationalism', a theory (implicitly or explicitly) based on
> > materialism, although in a manner which (witness our recent dialogues),
> > at least so far as its putative association with consciousness is
> > concerned, in an entirely 'relational' manner which is extremely opaque
> > as to its roots in 'physical causality'.
>
> No, not entirely opaque.
>
> > and
> >
> > 2) COMP - a theory which posits the emergence of 'matter' as a measure
> > on a computationally prior 1-person level - hence defining its
> > axiomatic base solely in terms of computational fundamentals - CT, AR,
> > etc.
>
> Bruno uses 'comp' to mean the 'axiomatic base', not
> the conclusion.
>
> > David
> >
> > > David Nyman wrote:
> > > > Brent Meeker wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > But it's still a model, one based on arithmetic rather than matter, and the only way to > judge whether it is a good model to see how it corresponds with "mere appearance"; just > like we test QM, general relativity, and every other theory. It *might* be the really real > model - but so might any other model that fits all the data.
> > > >
> > > > Yes, of course, Brent - hence my comments later on in my post. But in
> > > > fact, comp implies that the normal physics model can't 'fit all the
> > > > data', if we include (as we must) the 1-person pov itself in 'the
> > > > data'.
> > >
> > > Computationalism doesn't imply that. a conflict between
> > > computationalism and physicalism would be be astonshing
> > > and highly significant. A conflict between physicalsim and Platonism
> > > is much less so.
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Received on Sun Oct 22 2006 - 14:59:08 PDT