Brent Meeker wrote:
> Suppose that theory X predicts there are some things we'll never figure out. And there are > some things we haven't figured out. That's at best extremely weak support for theory X.
I would agree were that the case. But surely the potential power of
comp qua Theory X is precisely, to the extent that it is correct, that
it may give us the possibility of figuring out (or at least
illuminating somewhat) an area that has appeared extremely opaque in
terms of physics as currently conceived.
> Yes, I find it interesting and I'm willing to spend time trying to understand it - but being > contrary to empiricism doesn't count in it's favor in my view.
I'm puzzled as to why you say it's contrary to empiricism. AFAICS comp
doesn't require us to ignore the evidence of our senses, but offers a
different rationale for how such data gets to be there, compared to
that offered by standard physics. The observables that either model
attempts to account for are the same, and either is empirical to the
extent it presents disconfirmable predictions vis-a-vis those
observables. Beyond this, where the 'observables' relate more directly
to the 1-person pov itself, rather than its emergent phenomena, it
seems to me that comp may offer more insight and empirical
opportunities than a 'physical computationalism', which AFAICS has
always been a largely blank promissory note drawn on 'well, what else
could it possibly be'?
We shall see.
David
> David Nyman wrote:
> > Brent Meeker wrote:
> >
> >> But it's still a model, one based on arithmetic rather than matter, and the only way to > judge whether it is a good model to see how it corresponds with "mere appearance"; just > like we test QM, general relativity, and every other theory. It *might* be the really real > model - but so might any other model that fits all the data.
> >
> > Yes, of course, Brent - hence my comments later on in my post. But in
> > fact, comp implies that the normal physics model can't 'fit all the
> > data', if we include (as we must) the 1-person pov itself in 'the
> > data'.
>
> Suppose that theory X predicts there are some things we'll never figure out. And there are some things we haven't figured out. That's at best extremely weak support for theory X.
>
> >And my point is also that a model which is, in this respect
> > particularly, so counter to 'normal science' is especially provocative
> > and deserves much attention.
>
> Yes, I find it interesting and I'm willing to spend time trying to understand it - but being contrary to empiricism doesn't count in it's favor in my view.
>
> Brent Meeker
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Received on Sat Oct 21 2006 - 03:01:05 PDT