Peter Jones writes:
> Under physicalism, one physical state corresponds to one total
> conscious state.
>
> I suppose it is possible, even under constraints which exlude baroque
> re-intrerpretations, for one physical state to implement more than
> one computational state. A computational state is basically a subset of
> a physical
> state. A physical state could have two disjoint computational subsets.
>
> This
> is just "parallel processing". I suppose the human
> equivalent would be patients who have had "split brain" surgery for
> epilepsy.
Parallel processing is a case of many physical states -> one computational
state, isn't it? I don't think this is at all problematic in computer science, and
it is the basis of any functionalist theory of consciousness. However, the
reverse relationship, one physical state -> many computational states is
deeply problematic if computation is taken to be the basis of consciousness,
because it destroys the supervenience thesis as commonly understood.
Stathis Papaioannou
_________________________________________________________________
Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail.
http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d
--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list.domain.name.hidden
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list-unsubscribe.domain.name.hidden
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
Received on Mon Oct 16 2006 - 23:24:33 PDT