Re: Maudlin's argument

From: 1Z <>
Date: Sun, 15 Oct 2006 08:53:28 -0700

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

> Russell Standish writes:
> > If the same QM state is associated with different observer moments,
> > you must be talking about some non-functionalist approach to
> > consciousness. The QM state, by definition, contains all information
> > that can be extracted from observation.
> Functionalism explicitly allows that different physical states may implement
> the same observer moment. For example, OM1 could be implemented on a
> computer running Mac OS going through physical state S1, or by an equivalent
> program running on the same computer emulating Windows XP on Mac OS
> going through state S2. In this way, there is potentially a large number of
> distinct physical states S1, S2... Sn on the one machine all implementing OM1.
> Is there any reason to suppose inclusion of a physical state in this set S1... Sn
> prevents it from implementing any OM other than OM1?

If "this set" is the set of all phsyical states that possibly implement
OM1, the any physical state either in the set, or doesn't belong there.

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Received on Sun Oct 15 2006 - 11:53:48 PDT

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