On Oct 10, 2:56 pm, "1Z" <peterdjo....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> > If you aren't in fact
> > claiming this, then your appeal to 'computation' as picking out the
> > relevant properties can be valid only in the context of *specific*, not
> > generalised, instantiations, and thus becomes merely a shorthand for
> > decribing tightly constrained activities of just *those* physical
> > systems.
>
> I have no idea how you come to that conclusion.
I don't see how you can *avoid* this conclusion, unless you've landed
on some unexcluded middle position that I fail to grasp. If
computationalists claim the same set of properties as are picked out by
*any* instantiation of a computation are also responsible for a stable
state of consciousness, then they simply aren't being serious about the
'physical' aspect of these 'properties'. Any relationship whatever
between the properties that support computation, and those putatively
reponsible for any 1-person state of the machine, is *irrelevant* to
the causal explanation of the computation (i.e. such a state could vary
wildly with the instantiation, but this would have no effect whatsover
on the computation *qua computation*). However, it's precisely what
*must* be relevant if the internal state is to be determined by those
selfsame properties. To claim that the *same* 1-person state is
generated by wildly variable sets of properties, is precisely to say
that such 'properties' - i.e. whatever material aspects they are
supposed to pick out - are in effect *irrelevant* to the state. This
appears to be flatly contradictory, unless in effect the 'properties'
so picked out are not in any meaningful sense 'physical' - i.e. they
are purely relational. In this case, I would have to agree with Bruno
that 'matter' is simply being deployed as a placeholder for relata, and
has no further explanatory role (except existence, of course - your
sticking point, I think).
David
> David Nyman wrote:
> > On Oct 10, 2:51 am, "1Z" <peterdjo....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>
> > > It's a claim of computationalism. I am just explaining how
> > > computationalism is compatible with physicalism. You
> > > are complaining about circularity, not contradiction!
>
> > So you're saying that this variety of computationalism merely claims
> > that whatever 'physical properties' happen to be picked out by the
> > 'right sort of computation' must be the ones that are responsible for
> > consciousness? But this is just dogma masquerading as explanation.Saying "X-ists claim Y" is not dogma. Saying "Y, because i say so" is
> dogma.
>
> > > But remember
> > > that I have a narrowish view of what is a computer. And remember
> > > that consciousness is not held to be any old computation.
>
> > Yes, but are you saying that *any old instantiation*, provided it
> > implements to your satisfaction the 'right sort of computation', must
> > by that token be conscious, whatever 'physical properties' it employs?I am saying that computationalists say that.
>
> > If you are, then AFAICS you're either claiming that *any old physical
> > properties* that implement the computation are fact doing the work of
> > creating consciousness, or that *none* are. Either option is
> > effectively abandoning materialism as the explanation for why the
> > computation is deemed to cause consciousness.It isn't abandoning "materialism" as the claim that matter exists.
>
> It *is* claiming that computation is a kind of shorthand for the
> sets of relevant physical properties. So what? Maybe
> all our current physics is an approximate, high-level
> rendition of something more fundamental. It's just a claim
> about what the right level of decription is. Most neuroscientists
> don't think you have t go down to the quantum level,
> even if they don't think the computational level
> is the right level of description.
>
> (It is also abandoning token-token identity theory. Are
> you getting that confused with materialism?)
>
> > If you aren't in fact
> > claiming this, then your appeal to 'computation' as picking out the
> > relevant properties can be valid only in the context of *specific*, not
> > generalised, instantiations, and thus becomes merely a shorthand for
> > decribing tightly constrained activities of just *those* physical
> > systems.I have no idea how you come to that conclusion.
>
> > In this case, you retain your appeal to materialism as
> > causally relevant, but mere 'computational equivalence', in the
> > implementation-independent mathematical sense, ceases to predict which
> > physical systems will be conscious, and which not.No it doesn't. Any system that implements computation C will be
> conscious, According To Computationalism. The other
> factors aren't relevant. ATC.
>
> > David
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Received on Tue Oct 10 2006 - 12:42:27 PDT