On Oct 9, 8:54 pm, George Levy <g....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> To observe a split consciousness, you need an observer who is also
> split, in sync with the split consciousness, across time, space,
> substrate and level (a la Zelazny - Science Fiction writer). In your
> example, for an observer to see consciousness in the machine, he must be
> willing to exist at the earlier interval, skip over the time delay
> carrying the recording and resume his existence at the later interval.
> If he observes only a part of the whole thing, say the recording, he may
> conclude that the machine is not conscious.
Careful, George. Remember the observer *is* the machine. Consequently
he's never in a position to 'conclude that the machine is not
conscious', because in that case, it is precisely *he* that is not
conscious. But you're right IMO that the the concatenation of these
observer moments represents the observer's conscious 'existence in
time' . The 1-person narrative of this concatenation is what comprises
IMO, the A-series (i.e. the conscious discriminability of observer
moments arising from the consistent 1-person compresence of global and
local aspects of the observer), whereas any 3-person account of this is
necessarily stripped back to a B-series that reduces, ultimately, to
Planck-length 'snapshots' devoid of temporality.
David
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >Le 08-oct.-06, à 08:00, George Levy a écrit :
>
> >>Bruno,
>
> >>Finally I read your filmed graph argument which I have stored in my
> >>computer. (The original at the Iridia web site
> >>http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume3CC/3%20%202%20.pdf
> >>is not accessible anymore. I am not sure why.)
>
> >Thanks for telling. I know people a reconfiguring the main
> >server at IRIDIA, I hope it is only that.
>
> >>In page TROIS -61 you describe an experience of consciousness which is
> >>comprised partially of a later physical process and partially of the
> >>recording of an earlier physical process.
>
> >>It is possible to resolve the paradox simply by saying that
> >>consciousness involves two partial processes each occupying two
> >>different time intervals, the time intervals being connected by a
> >>recording, such that the earlier partial process is combined with the
> >>later partial process, the recording acting as a connection device.
>
> >I mainly agree. But assuming comp it seems to me this is just a
> >question of "acceptable" implementation of consciousness.
> >Once implemented in any "correct" ways, the reasoning shows, or is
> >supposed to show, that the inner first person experience cannot be
> >attributed to the physical activity. The "physical" keep an important
> >role by giving the frame of the possible relative manifestations of the
> >consciousness. But already at this stage, consciousness can no more
> >been attached to it. On the contrary, keeping the comp hyp, the
> >physical must emerge from the coherence of "enough" possible relative
> >manifestations.
>
> >>I am not saying that consciousness supervene on the physical substrate.
> >>All I am saying is that the example does not prove that consciousness
> >>does not supervene the physical. The example is just an instance of
> >>consciousness operating across two different time intervals by mean of
> >>a
> >>physical substrate and a physical means (recording) of connecting these
> >>two time intervals.
>
> >In this case, would you take this as an argument for the necessity of
> >the physical, you would change the notion of physical supervenience a
> >lot. You would be attaching consciousness to some history of physical
> >activity.I agree with all this. I would be changing the notion of physical
> supervenience such that the physical substrate can be split into time
> intervals connected by recordings. . But why stop here. We could create
> an example in which the substrate is maximally split, across time,
> space, substrate and level.
>
> On the other hand, widening the domain of supervenience (time, space,
> substrate and level) does not seem to eliminate the need for the
> physical. Here I am arguing against myself... We may solve the problem
> if we make supervenience recursive, i.e.. software supervening on itself
> without needing a physical substrate just like photons do not need Ether.
>
> In addition, if we are going to split consciousness maximally in this
> fashion, the concept of observer becomes important, something you do not
> include in your example.
>
> To observe a split consciousness, you need an observer who is also
> split, in sync with the split consciousness, across time, space,
> substrate and level (a la Zelazny - Science Fiction writer). In your
> example, for an observer to see consciousness in the machine, he must be
> willing to exist at the earlier interval, skip over the time delay
> carrying the recording and resume his existence at the later interval.
> If he observes only a part of the whole thing, say the recording, he may
> conclude that the machine is not conscious.
>
>
>
> >But if you keep comp, you will not been able to use genuinely
> >that past physical activity. If you could, it would be like asking to
> >the doctor an artificial brain with the guarantee that the hardware of
> >that brain has been gone through some genuine physical stories,
> >although no memory of those stories are needed in the computation made
> >by the new (artificial) brain; or if such memory *are* needed, it would
> >mean the doctor has not made the right level choice.
> >Now, when you say the reasoning does not *prove* that consciousness
> >does not supervene the physical, you are correct. But sup-phys says
> >there is no consciousness without the physical, i.e. some physical
> >primary ontology is needed for consciusness, and that is what the
> >reasoning is supposed to be showing absurd: not only we don't need the
> >physical (like thermodynamicians do not need "invisible horses pulling
> >cars"), but MOVIE-GRAPH + UDA (*) makes obligatory the appearance of
> >the physical emerging from *all* (relative) computations, making twice
> >the concept of primitive matter useless.
> >OK? ...I realize I could be clearer(**)
>
> >(*) Caution: in "Conscience et Mecanisme" the movie-graph argument
> >precedes the UD argument (the seven first step of the 8-steps-version
> >of the current UDA). In my Lille thesis, the movie graph follows the UD
> >argument for eliminating the use of the "existence of a universe
> >hypothesis"; so there are some nuances between the different versions.
>
> >(**) I am open to thoroughly discuss this, for example in november.
> >Right now I am a bit over-busy (until the end of october).OK. Take your time.
>
> >Bruno
>
> >http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/George
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Received on Mon Oct 09 2006 - 16:19:43 PDT