David Nyman wrote:
> On Oct 8, 6:29 pm, "1Z" <peterdjo....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>
> Yes. But he says he isn't assuming Platonism, although he must be.
>
> Well, if he is, so what? If we allow him this, what then follows -
> isn't this more interesting?
>
> He claims that computationalism is incompatible with
> > materialism. That is not modest (or correct AFAICS)
>
> I think the 'modesty' part is meant more to relate to provability
> vs.believability, per Goedel/Lob - that we must live with doubt (i.e.
> empiricism is ineliminable). As to computationalism, there seems to be
> some confusion on the list (and elsewhere) between (at least) two
> varieties.
At least four!
> The first might I suppose be characterised as minimalist
> comp, dealing with programs as instantiated in (as one might say) real
> - i.e. material - computers. Clearly it would make no sense to say that
> this kind of computationalism is incompatible with materialism - i.e
> that physical processes can 'compute'.
>
> So how does he get "computationalism is incompatible with
> > materialism" out of such interviews?
>
> >From the 8th step of the UDA argument. This attempts to show that if
> one (but not you, I think?) starts with the much stronger assumption
> that *consciousness supervenes on computation itself*,
What is a "computation itself"? A process? And algorithm?
> then it can't
> also supervene on the physical.
Using supplementary assumptions -- such as "only activity counts".
> AFAICS, this stems fundamentally from
> the inability to stabilise the instantiation of a computation, given
> the lack of constraint on the material substrates that can be construed
> as implementing equivalent computations. Given materialism, in other
> words, 'computation' is just a metaphor - it's the physics that does
> the work.
Yes, but it is still quite possible that a class of phsyical
systems picked out by some computational(but ultimately physical)
set of properties are conscious/cognitive in veirtue of those
proeprties -- ie computationalism is a sort of convenient
shorthand or shortcut to the physically relevant properties.
> I have to say that I think this may really point to a fatal
> flaw in any assumption - within materialism - that consciousness can
> supervene on the physical *per computation* in the standard AI sense.
> However, consciousness may of course still be shown to supervene on
> some physically stabilisable material process (e.g. at the neurological
> or some other consistently materially-reducible level of explanation).
>
> Bruon's empirical prediction require a UD to exist. That
> > is an assumption beyond computationalism.
>
> But not beyond 'comp', which is a horse of a different colour.
A Trojan horse with Plato in its belly...
> The UDA
> argument attempts to establish, and show the consequences of, a 'comp'
> constrained to CT, AR, and the 'modest empiricism' of 'yes doctor'. It
> *assumes* that putative stable conscious experiences are associated
> with certain types of machine thus defined. From this stems the claim
> that the consciousness of such machines can't simultaneously supervene
> on an unstabilisable externally-defined 'material' substrate - in fact,
> the 'material' also has to be an emergent from the computational in
> this view.
You are presenting the conclusions, not the argument.
> Comp and materialism start from radically different
> assumptions, and have diametrically opposed explanatory directions.
The idea that materialism is not compatible with computationalism
is a bold and startling claim.
If comp is not "standard" computationalism, the fact that it is
incompatible with materalism may be a lot less impactive.
comp might simply beg the question.
> However, I don't think they treat the *observables* in any essential
> way as less 'real', but differ radically as to the source - and here
> its does get difficult, because one can no longer simply appeal
> directly to those observables - as Johnson failed to note in stubbing
> his toe on the stone.
The Johnsonian argument can be used as a wayof establishing the meaning
of "exist". It answers the question "what definition of existence
is there other than the mathematical one".
> How can he come to conclusions about the uneality
> > of matter without assuming the reality of something
> > to take its place?
>
> Well, in the end we can only believe that whatever it is must be 'real
> in the sense that I am real', or where are we?
The point is that computationalists can continue to believe in matter
so long as they don't believe in numbers.
> No, it's really easy. I am real, or I would not
> > be writing this. What you mean is to
> > establish it by abstract argumentation is difficult.
> > Well, it is. That is why empiricists prefer empiricisim.
>
> Well, as you know, I've also had some discomfort with aspects of
> platonic or other possibly implicit assumptions in this approach, but I
> think now that it's interesting and fruitful enough to suspend
> judgement on this pending further (preferably empirically refutable)
> results, without fully committing as a believer - but then that is not
> what is demanded. However, I acknowledge the robustness of your
> Johnsonian approach to refutation!
> David
>
> > David Nyman wrote:
> > > On Oct 7, 1:16 pm, "1Z" <peterdjo....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> >
> > > Numbers that haven't been reified in any sense,
> > > > don't exist in any way and therefore don't behave in any
> > > > way.
> >
> > > Forgive me for butting in again, but is there not some way to stop this
> > > particular disagreement from going round in circles interminably,
> > > entertaining though it may be? For what it's worth, it seems to me that
> > > Bruno has been saying that you get a number of interesting (and
> > > unexpected) results when you start from a certain minimum set of
> > > assumptions involving numbers and their relations.Yes. But he says he isn't assuming Platonism, although he must be.
> >
> > > As he often
> > > reiterates, this is a 'modest' view, making no claim to exclusive
> > > explanatory truth,He claims that computationalism is incompatible with
> > materialism. That is not modest (or correct AFAICS)
> >
> > > and - dealing as it does in 'machine psychology' -
> > > limiting its claims to the consequences of 'interviewing' such machines
> > > and discovering their povs.So how does he get "computationalism is incompatible with
> > materialism" out of such interviews?
> >
> > > In achieving these results, AFAICS, no
> > > claims need be made about the fundamental 'ontic realism' of numbers:
> > > rather one is doing logic or mathematics from an axiomatic basis in the
> > > normal way.How can he come to conclusions about the uneality
> > of matter without assuming the reality of something
> > to take its place?
> >
> > > The question of which set of 'ontic prejudices' we in fact employ as we
> > > go about our daily affairs is of course another issue.And yet antoher issue is whether the conclusions of
> > a valid arguiment must be contained in its premises.
> >
> > > It may of course
> > > eventually turn out that theoretical or, preferably empirically
> > > disconfirmable, results derived from comp become so compelling as to
> > > force fundamental re-consideration of even such quotidian assumptions -
> > > e.g. the notorious 'yes doctor' proposition.Bruon's empirical prediction require a UD to exist. That
> > is an assumption beyond computationalism.
> >
> > > But as Bruno is again at
> > > pains to point out, this won't be based on 'sure knowledge'. It will
> > > always entail some 'act of faith'.
> >
> > > To establish what is in some ultimate sense 'real' - as opposed to
> > > knowable or communicable - is extraordinarily difficult,No, it's really easy. I am real, or I would not
> > be writing this. What you mean is to
> > establish it by abstract argumentation is difficult.
> > Well, it is. That is why empiricists prefer empiricisim.
> >
> > > and perhaps at
> > > root incoherent. The debate, for example, over whether the
> > > computational supervenes on the physical doesn't hinge on the 'ontic
> > > reality' of the fundamental assumptions of physicalism or
> > > computationalism. Rather, it's about resolving the explanatory
> > > commensurability (or otherwise) of the sets of observables and
> > > relations characteristic of these theoretical perspectives. Indeed what
> > > else could it possibly be for humans (or machines) with only such data
> > > at our disposal?
> >
> > > David
> >
> > > > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > > > > There is no need to reify the numbers.[...]
> >
> > > > > I don't think so. Once you accept that the number theoretical truth is
> > > > > independent of you (which I take as a form of humility), then it can be
> > > > > explained quite precisely why "numbers" (in a third person view-view)
> > > > > are bounded to believe in a physical (third person sharable) reality
> > > > > and in a unnameable first person reality etc.Numbers that haven't been reified in any sense,
> > > > don't exist in any way and therefore don't behave in any
> > > > way.
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Received on Mon Oct 09 2006 - 13:35:37 PDT