Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
>
>>Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>>Brent Meeker writes:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>>It is consistent with Maudlin's paper to say consciousness supervenes on no
>>>>>physical activity - i.e. on computation as Platonic object - but it is also consistent
>>>>>to say that it supervenes on a recording, or on any physical activity, and that
>>>>>perhaps if there were no physical universe with at least a single quantum state
>>>>>there would be no consciousness. Admittedly the latter is inelegant compared to
>>>>>the "no physical supervenience" idea, but I can't quite see how to eliminate it
>>>>>completely.
>>>
>>>
>>>>But note that Maudlin's argument depends on being in a classical world. The quantum
>>>>world in which we live the counterfactuals are always realized with some probability.
>>>
>>>
>>>I assume you are referring to the MWI interpretation, in which the counterfactuals are
>>>always realised in some branch with certainty; in a classical world, the counterfactuals
>>>are realised with some probability just as in the CI of QM. In any case, I don't see that
>>>it makes much difference to the argument. Consider this model of the MWI case. A machine
>>>is made up of two parts, a1 and b1, such that a1 is active at a particular time and b1
>>>comes into play from an inert state to alter the activity of a1 only if a counterfactual is
>>>realised. It seems absurd to say that a1 is conscious when it undergoes some physical
>>>activity with b1 hovering over it inertly (because the counterfactual is not realised) but not
>>>conscious when it undergoes the same activity without b1 in place. But it seems no less
>>>absurd to me to say that a1 or a1b1 is conscious with an identical machine next to it, a2b2,
>>>in which the counterfactual is realised, but not if a2b2 is not present. For how would a1/a1b1
>>>know or care about a2b2, whether in the next room or in another branch of the multiverse?
>>
>>It's not a question of whether the "counterfactual" occurs. If it occured it
>>wouldn't be counterfactual. The point is that in QM what occurs depends on what
>>could have occur but didn't; c.f. quant-ph/9610033, or seach arXiv.org for
>>"interaction free measurment".
>
>
> Doesn't this refer to quantum interference effects? Otherwise what would be the distinction between
> a quantum computer and a classical computer in what we know is a quantum world?
>
> Stathis Papaioannou
Yes, it does depend on quantum interference. But a "classical computer" in this
quantum world can only be *approximately* classical. So I'm wondering how that
affects Maudlin's argument and others that depend on counterfactuals making no
difference.
Brent Meeker
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Received on Sat Oct 07 2006 - 22:31:24 PDT