Le 03-oct.-06, à 06:56, George Levy a écrit :
> Bruno Marchal wrote in explaining Maudlin's argument:
>
>> "For any given precise running computation associated to some inner
>> experience, you
>> can modify the device in such a way that the amount of physical
>> activity involved is
>> arbitrarily low, and even null for dreaming experience which has no
>> inputs and no outputs.
>> Now, having suppressed that physical activity present in the running
>> computation, the
>> machine will only be accidentally correct. It will be correct only
>> for that precise computation,
>> with unchanged environment. If it is changed a little bit, it will
>> make the machine running
>> computation no more relatively correct. But then, Maudlin
>> ingenuously showed that
>> counterfactual correctness can be recovered, by adding non active
>> devices which will be
>> triggered only if some (counterfactual) change would appear in the
>> environment.
>>
>
>
> To reduce the machine's complexity Maudlin must perform a modicum of
> analysis, simulation etc.. to predict how the machine performs in
> different situations. Using his newly acquired knowledge, he then
> maximally reduces the machine's complexity for one particular task,
> keeping the machine fully operational for all other tasks. In effect
> Maudlin has surreptitiously inserted himself in the mechanism. so now,
> we don't have just the machine but we have the machine plus Maudlin.
> The machine is not simpler or not existent. The machine is now
> Maudlin!
(We can come back on this real critics, but here is a short answer for
those who have Mauldlin's paper, we can find a version on the net now).
Olympia is "proto-olympia" + "the Klaras". Maudlin assumes comp and he
needs only the description of the original machine to build the Klaras
(for regaining counterfactual correctness) and add them to the
proto-olympia (the machine with no physical activity which is only
accidentally correct). Once added, the composed, Olympia =
"proto-olympia + Klara", is independent of Maudlin, and is
computationnaly equivalent with the original machine).
So Olympia, once build, does not need Maudlin's at all. Of course with
comp the building itself cannot influence the future possible
supervenience, for the same reason that if a doctor give you an
artificial brain, the story of each individual components has no
relation with the later use of it (if not it means the comp level has
not been chosen correctly).
>
> In conclusion, the following conclusion reached by Maudlin and Bruno
> is fallacious.
>
>> "Now this shows that any inner experience can be associated with an
>> arbitrary low (even null) physical
>> activity, and this in keeping counterfactual correctness. And that
>> is absurd with the
>> conjunction of both comp and materialism."
>
>
> I think the paradox can be resolved by tracing how information flows
> and Maudlin is certainly in the circuit, using information, just like
> Maxwell's demon is affecting entropy.
Once Olympia is build, Maudlin's is completely out of the circuit. I
think you forget the purpose of the Klaras.
At least, George, this is a real attempt to find an error, and in the
8th step ! I appreciate your try, but it seems to me you have just
forgot that Maudlin's did *program* his intervention: through the
Klaras, so that keeping comp at this stage makes Maudlin's special role
irrelevant. OK?
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Received on Tue Oct 03 2006 - 11:14:34 PDT