Re: Russell's book + UD*/strings

From: Bruno Marchal <>
Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2006 11:46:20 +0200

Le 26-sept.-06, à 16:03, Russell Standish a écrit :

> I would say also that interpretations could be inconsistent,

? ? ?
I guess you are using the word "interpretation" in some non standard
It would help us, and you, if you could work on a glossary.

> but
> perhaps there is not much difference between interpretation and
> theory. Would you say "There is a red flower" is a theory, or merely
> an interpretation of an image?

It could be a theory, ... then if you interpret the word "red" by the
adjective green with its usual meaning, and the word "flower" by
inhabitant of the planet mars, then the interpretation of "there is a
red flower" is a correct theory with respect to realities where there
are green inhabitant on Mars, and incorrect in the realities where
there are no green inhabitant on Mars.
In that sense "there is a red flower" can be seen as a theory. I assume
here that "there is" is borrowed from a classical logic in the

> If it were possible to view the entire "Nothing",


> it would be
> an inconsistent interpretation. However it is not so possible, and
> indeed it may be true that it is impossible to have an inconsistent
> interpretation (I do not assert this however).

I think it would be helpful to use the standard meaning of those term,
or at least, to define them precisely if you use them in some other

> Indeed - however we do have a difference in emphasis. Yours is towards
> more formal models, but with obscure modeling relations,

My emphasis is on machine which are formal by construction, and the
obscure modeling relation are old and new theorems in mathematical
logic. It is just applied mathematics.
The modelling relations are strange and mysterious, but this is just
because Godel and Lob theorems are somehow themselves strange and

> But is this 1-3 distinction implicit within your statement of COMP?
> I'm not sure that it is.

I think it is, and the following quote makes me thing you believe this
too, at least in the quantum framework, when you say:
<<Collapse is conceived of as a physical process, and as such is
problematic. Nonphysical collapse is just the 1 POV of the
Multiverse. That's all I'm talking about.>>

> It is not new, it underlies all of Chapter 2 of my book, and also of
> "Why Occams Razor". Perhaps I'm guilty of assuming it without
> explicitly stating it, but by way of challenge can you give me a piece
> of knowledge that doesn't come in the form of a string?

Knowledge comes from third person finite strings, with a measure
determined by *some* infinite strings (the non halting immaterial
computations) generating them.

> It is
> certainly hard, given we live on the opposite sides of a digital world
> - a record of a telephone conversation we have will be a a string of
> bits, as will any emails we use, any my book left my hands in the form
> of a string of bits and so on.

OK, but that are finite strings conceived and manipulated (by your
computer and your brain with some high level comp assumption) as
numbers. Most test editor manipulate a structure of finite strings
together with a concatenation or substitution structure. Again this is
infinitely richer that your set of all infinite strings.

> I use the usual one (excluded middle), and I don't use any infinity
> axiom that I'm aware of.

Now I am very confused. I thought you were assuming infinite strings. A
glossary would really help, I am not sure you are not changing the
meaning of your term from paragraph to paragraph.

> Yes - I appreciate the ontological difference. I would say that only
> "Nothing" exists (in ontological meaning). Strings and sets of strings
> only exist in the same sense that the number "1" exists.

This contradict the definition of "Nothing" you gave us.

>> I could elaborate a lot about the vagueness of the notion of "finding"
>> something in the UD* (the infinite complete running of the UD).
>> I could ask "finding by who?", from inside? from the terrestrial
>> (verifiable) view or the divine one (true but non verifiable)?, from
>> which x-person point of view? Etc.
>> Given that the UD cannot not dovetail on all the reals, there is a
>> sense in saying all the infinite strings are generated, but this gives
>> a noisy background first person machine have to live with. The UD is
>> not equivalent with "all infinite strings", the UD* is a static given
>> of all computations. Those computations can be represented by very
>> peculiar finite and infinite strings together with a non trivial
>> structure inherited from computer science/number theory.
> About the only difference I see is that the measure might be
> different...

And that *is* the key issue, I think.

> I more or less always assumed this. Either COMP is more specialised
> (you can derive some my postulates from COMP, and others are compatible
> with it), or COMP is the only way of deriving these same postulates,
> or COMP in some way contradicts these postulates.

As you admit yourself there is a lot of work to get enough precision in
your approach to compare it with the consequence of the
computationalist hypothesis.
As I do have a lot of work to compare the comp-physics with the
experimental physics.

> I do not know which after 8 years of studying it.

Sometimes I define strong comp by saying yes to the doctor, and weak
comp by accpetoing your child marry someone who has say yes to the
doctor. Surely you have an opinion on that, no?


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Received on Fri Sep 29 2006 - 05:48:04 PDT

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