- Contemporary messages sorted: [ by date ] [ by thread ] [ by subject ] [ by author ] [ by messages with attachments ]

From: Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Sun, 24 Sep 2006 15:23:44 +0200

Le 23-sept.-06, ˆ 07:01, Russell Standish a Žcrit :

*> Anything provable by a finite set of axioms is necessarily a finite
*

*> string of
*

*> symbols, and can be found as a subset of my Nothing.
*

You told us that your Nothing contains all strings. So it contains all

formula as "theorems". But a theory which contains all formulas as

theorems is inconsistent.

I am afraid you confuse some object level (the strings) and

theory-level (the theorems about the strings).

Perhaps the exchange is unfair because I react as a "professional

logician", and you try to convey something informally. But I think that

at some point, in our difficult subject, we need to be entirely clear

on what we assume or not especially if you are using formal objects,

like strings.

*> I should note that the PROJECTION postulate is implicit in your UDA
*

*> when you come to speak of the 1-3 distinction. I don't think it can be
*

*> derived explicitly from the three "legs" of COMP.
*

I'm afraid your are confusing the UDA, which is an informal (but

rigorous) argument showing that IF I am "digitalisable" machine, then

physics or the "laws of Nature" emerge and are derivable from number

theory, and the translation of UDA in arithmetic, alias the interview

of a universal chatty machine. The UDA is a "reductio ad absurdo". It

assumes explicitly consciousness (or folk psychology or grandma

psychology as I use those terms in the SANE paper) and a primitive

physical universe. With this, the 1-3 distinction follows from the fact

that if am copied at the correct level, the two copies cannot know the

existence of each other and their personal discourse will

differentiate. This is an "illusion" of projection like the wave packet

*reduction* is an "illusion" in Everett theory. The UDA reasoning is

simple and the conclusion is that there is no primitive physical

universe or comp is false. Physics emerges then intuitively from just

"immaterial dreams" with subtle overlappings. The UDA does not need to

be formalized to become rigorous. But having that UDA-result, we have a

thoroughly precise way to extract physics (and all the other

hypostases) from the universal interview. For *this* we need to be

entirely specific and formal. That is why in *all* my papers (on this

subject) I never separate UDA from the lobian interview. This is hard:

I would not have succeed without Godel, Lob and other incompleteness

theorems.

I have a problem with your way of talking because you are mixing

informal talk with formal object (like the strings). Like when you

write:

*> The Nothing itself does not have any properties in itself to speak
*

*> of. Rather it is the PROJECTION postulate that means we can treat it
*

*> as the set of all strings, from which any conscious viewpoint must
*

*> correspond to a subset of strings.
*

It looks like a mixing of UDA and the lobian UDA. It is too much fuzzy

for me.

*>
*

*>> But it is neither "nothing". It is the natural numbers without
*

*>> addition
*

*>> and multiplication, the countable order, + non standard models.
*

*>
*

*> I disagree - it is more like the real numbers without order, addition
*

*> and multiplication group structures, but perhaps with the standard
*

*> topology, since I want to derive a measure.
*

Are you saying that your Nothing is the topological line? Again it is

not nothing (or it is very confusing to call it nothing), and what you

intend will depend on your axiomatization of it. If you stay in first

order logic, this will give an even weaker theory than the theory of

finite strings: you will no more be able to prove the existence of any

integer, or if you take a second order logic presentation of it, then

your "nothing" will contain much more than what the ontic comp toes

needs, and this is still much more than "nothing". To be franc I am

astonished you want already infinite objects at the ontological level.

If *all* infinite strings are in the ontology, that could be a

departure from comp (and that would be interesting because, by UDA,

that would make your theory predicting a different physics and then we

could test it (at least in principle), and only when your theory will

be precise enough.

*> I don't know what Q1, Q2 and Q3
*

*> are.
*

Robinson Arithmetic is formalized by the following set of axioms

(written in first order language and in "french"):

Q1) Ax 0 s(x) [0 is not a successor]

Q2) AxAy x y -> s(x) s(y) [different numbers have different

successors]

Q3) Ax (x 0 -> Ey(x = s(y)) [all numbers are successor,

except 0]

Together with the definition of addition:

Q4) Ax x + 0 = x [adding 0 to a number doesn't change it]

Q5) AxAy x + s(y) = s(x + y) {adding some number x with a

successor of some number y gives the successor of the addition of x and

y]

and the definition of multiplication:

Q6) Ax x * 0 = 0 [multiplying a number by 0 gives 0]

Q7) AxAy x * s(y) = (x * y) + x [if someone asks I will put this

one in english but it is long and less understandable!]

PA, Peano Arithmetic, the "simplest" lobian machine for our purpose: is

RA + the inductions axioms:

[ if P(0) and Ax (P(x) -> P(s(x)) ] -> AxP(x)

RA is too dumb to be interviewed, but sufficiently clever to simulate

the Universal Dovetailer, including the infinitely simulation of PA,

and I interview those PAs. Unlike RA, PA has strong introspective

power. PA can prove its own Godel and Lob theorems.

For example, if we let RA dovetail on all the proofs RA can build, then

soon or later RA will prove that PA can prove the consistency of RA,

but RA itself will never prove its own consistency. To infer that RA

can prove its own consistency from the fact that RA proves that PA

proves the consistency of RA would be like inferring I have a headache

when I simulate Einstein's brain and got the sentence "I have a

headache" (that is mainly Searle's error in his chinese room argument).

The distinction between RA and PA is introduced because we have to

distinguish simulation and belief/theory. Why do we *have to*? Because

of incompleteness which is the roots of all those nuances in computer

science, and from which I derive all hypostases or x-person point of

view, including the one which gives the "comp-physics".

TO SUM UP: the UDA is an informal rigorous, hopefully correct,

argument showing that if we are machine then we are immaterial machine

and that immateriality is contagious so that eventually (logically)

physics is derivable from number theory under the form of an hypostase

(the first person plural view).

The lobian interview *is* the extraction of physics (and of the other

hypostases). It presupposes a complete understanding of the UDA

consequence, and it extracts the comp-physics from assumptions on

numbers only.

I though your ontic TOE (the strings) was similar to RA, but I guess I

was wrong, so I am less sure I understand what you try to do.

Hope this helps,

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list.domain.name.hidden

To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list-unsubscribe.domain.name.hidden

For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list

-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

Received on Sun Sep 24 2006 - 09:25:14 PDT

Date: Sun, 24 Sep 2006 15:23:44 +0200

Le 23-sept.-06, ˆ 07:01, Russell Standish a Žcrit :

You told us that your Nothing contains all strings. So it contains all

formula as "theorems". But a theory which contains all formulas as

theorems is inconsistent.

I am afraid you confuse some object level (the strings) and

theory-level (the theorems about the strings).

Perhaps the exchange is unfair because I react as a "professional

logician", and you try to convey something informally. But I think that

at some point, in our difficult subject, we need to be entirely clear

on what we assume or not especially if you are using formal objects,

like strings.

I'm afraid your are confusing the UDA, which is an informal (but

rigorous) argument showing that IF I am "digitalisable" machine, then

physics or the "laws of Nature" emerge and are derivable from number

theory, and the translation of UDA in arithmetic, alias the interview

of a universal chatty machine. The UDA is a "reductio ad absurdo". It

assumes explicitly consciousness (or folk psychology or grandma

psychology as I use those terms in the SANE paper) and a primitive

physical universe. With this, the 1-3 distinction follows from the fact

that if am copied at the correct level, the two copies cannot know the

existence of each other and their personal discourse will

differentiate. This is an "illusion" of projection like the wave packet

*reduction* is an "illusion" in Everett theory. The UDA reasoning is

simple and the conclusion is that there is no primitive physical

universe or comp is false. Physics emerges then intuitively from just

"immaterial dreams" with subtle overlappings. The UDA does not need to

be formalized to become rigorous. But having that UDA-result, we have a

thoroughly precise way to extract physics (and all the other

hypostases) from the universal interview. For *this* we need to be

entirely specific and formal. That is why in *all* my papers (on this

subject) I never separate UDA from the lobian interview. This is hard:

I would not have succeed without Godel, Lob and other incompleteness

theorems.

I have a problem with your way of talking because you are mixing

informal talk with formal object (like the strings). Like when you

write:

It looks like a mixing of UDA and the lobian UDA. It is too much fuzzy

for me.

Are you saying that your Nothing is the topological line? Again it is

not nothing (or it is very confusing to call it nothing), and what you

intend will depend on your axiomatization of it. If you stay in first

order logic, this will give an even weaker theory than the theory of

finite strings: you will no more be able to prove the existence of any

integer, or if you take a second order logic presentation of it, then

your "nothing" will contain much more than what the ontic comp toes

needs, and this is still much more than "nothing". To be franc I am

astonished you want already infinite objects at the ontological level.

If *all* infinite strings are in the ontology, that could be a

departure from comp (and that would be interesting because, by UDA,

that would make your theory predicting a different physics and then we

could test it (at least in principle), and only when your theory will

be precise enough.

Robinson Arithmetic is formalized by the following set of axioms

(written in first order language and in "french"):

Q1) Ax 0 s(x) [0 is not a successor]

Q2) AxAy x y -> s(x) s(y) [different numbers have different

successors]

Q3) Ax (x 0 -> Ey(x = s(y)) [all numbers are successor,

except 0]

Together with the definition of addition:

Q4) Ax x + 0 = x [adding 0 to a number doesn't change it]

Q5) AxAy x + s(y) = s(x + y) {adding some number x with a

successor of some number y gives the successor of the addition of x and

y]

and the definition of multiplication:

Q6) Ax x * 0 = 0 [multiplying a number by 0 gives 0]

Q7) AxAy x * s(y) = (x * y) + x [if someone asks I will put this

one in english but it is long and less understandable!]

PA, Peano Arithmetic, the "simplest" lobian machine for our purpose: is

RA + the inductions axioms:

[ if P(0) and Ax (P(x) -> P(s(x)) ] -> AxP(x)

RA is too dumb to be interviewed, but sufficiently clever to simulate

the Universal Dovetailer, including the infinitely simulation of PA,

and I interview those PAs. Unlike RA, PA has strong introspective

power. PA can prove its own Godel and Lob theorems.

For example, if we let RA dovetail on all the proofs RA can build, then

soon or later RA will prove that PA can prove the consistency of RA,

but RA itself will never prove its own consistency. To infer that RA

can prove its own consistency from the fact that RA proves that PA

proves the consistency of RA would be like inferring I have a headache

when I simulate Einstein's brain and got the sentence "I have a

headache" (that is mainly Searle's error in his chinese room argument).

The distinction between RA and PA is introduced because we have to

distinguish simulation and belief/theory. Why do we *have to*? Because

of incompleteness which is the roots of all those nuances in computer

science, and from which I derive all hypostases or x-person point of

view, including the one which gives the "comp-physics".

TO SUM UP: the UDA is an informal rigorous, hopefully correct,

argument showing that if we are machine then we are immaterial machine

and that immateriality is contagious so that eventually (logically)

physics is derivable from number theory under the form of an hypostase

(the first person plural view).

The lobian interview *is* the extraction of physics (and of the other

hypostases). It presupposes a complete understanding of the UDA

consequence, and it extracts the comp-physics from assumptions on

numbers only.

I though your ontic TOE (the strings) was similar to RA, but I guess I

was wrong, so I am less sure I understand what you try to do.

Hope this helps,

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list.domain.name.hidden

To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list-unsubscribe.domain.name.hidden

For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list

-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

Received on Sun Sep 24 2006 - 09:25:14 PDT

*
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.3.0
: Fri Feb 16 2018 - 13:20:12 PST
*