Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
>
>>>I don't have a clear idea in my mind of disembodied computation except in rather simple cases,
>>>like numbers and arithmetic. The number 5 exists as a Platonic ideal, and it can also be implemented
>>>so we can interact with it, as when there is a collection of 5 oranges, or 3 oranges and 2 apples,
>>>or 3 pairs of oranges and 2 triplets of apples, and so on, in infinite variety. The difficulty is that if we
>>>say that "3+2=5" as exemplified by 3 oranges and 2 apples is conscious, then should we also say
>>>that the pairs+triplets of fruit are also conscious? If so, where do we draw the line?
>>
>>I'm not sure I understand your example. Are you saying that by simply existing, two
>>apples and 3 oranges compute 2+3=5? If so I would disagree. I would say it is our
>>comprehending them as individual objects and also as a set that is the computation.
>>Just hanging there on the trees they may be "computing" apple hanging on a tree,
>>apple hanging on a tree,... but they're not computing 2+3=5.
>
>
> What about my example in an earlier post of beads on an abacus? You can slide 2 beads to the left, then another
> 3 beads to the left, and count a total of 5 beads; or 2 pairs of beads and 3 pairs of beads and count a total of 5
> pairs of beads, or any other variation. Perhaps it seems a silly example when discussing consciousness, but the most
> elaborate (and putatively conscious) computation can be reduced to a complex bead-sliding exercise. And if sliding
> beads computes 2+3=5, why not if 2 birds and then 3 birds happen to land on a tree, or a flock of birds of which 2
> are red lands on one tree and another flock of birds of which 3 are red lands on an adjacent tree? It is true that these
> birds and beads are not of much consequence computationally unless someone is there to observe them and interpret
> them, but what about the computer that is conscious chug-chugging away all on its own?
No it's not a silly example; it's just that it seems that you are hypothesizing that
I am providing the computation by seeing the apples as a pair, by seeing the beads as
a triple and a pair and then as a quintuple. Above, this exchange began with you
posing this as an example of a disembodied computation - but then the examples seem
to depend on some (embodied) person witnessing them in order that the *be*
computations. I guess I'm not convinced that it makes sense to say that anything can
be a computation; other than in the trivial sense that it's a "simulation" of itself.
I agree that there is a mapping to a computation - but in most cases the mapping is
such that it seems more reasonable to say the computation is in the application of
the mapping. And I dont' mean that the mapping is complex - a mapping from my brain
states to yours would no doubt be very complex. I think the characteristic that
would allow us to say the thinking was not in the mapping is something like whether
it was static (like a look-up table) and not to large in some sense.
>
>>>That is what I mean
>>>when I say that any computation can map onto any physical system.
>>
>>But as you've noted before the computation is almost all in the mapping. And not
>>just in the map, but in the application of the map - which is something we do. That
>>action can't be abstracted away. You can't just say there's a physical system and
>>there's a manual that would map it into some computation and stop there as though the
>>computation has been done. The mapping, an action, still needs to be performed.
>
>
> What if the computer is built according to some ridiculously complex plan, plugged in, then all the engineers, manuals,
> etc. disappear. If it was conscious to begin with, does it suddenly cease being conscious because no-one is able to
> understand it? It could have been designed according to the radioactive decay patterns of a sacred stone, in which
> case without the documentation, its internal states might appear completely random. With the documentation, it may be
> possible to understand what it is doing or even interact with it, and you have said previously that it is the potential for
> interaction that allows it to be conscious, but does that mean it gradually becomes less conscious as pages of the manual
> are ripped out one by one and destroyed, even though the computer itself does not change its activity as a result?
>
>
>>>The physical structure and activity
>>>of computer A implementing program a may be completely different to that of computer B implementing
>>>program b, but program b may be an emulation of program a, which should make the two machines
>>>functionally equivalent and, under computationalism, equivalently conscious.
>>
>>I don't see any problem with supposing that A and B are equally conscious (or
>>unconscious).
>
>
> But there is a mapping under which any machine B is emulating a machine A.
But when is this mapping doing the computing and when is it A or B? It seems that
there must be an isomorphism between A and B processes at the level of an algorithm;
otherwise it is the mapping that is doing the computing, as when B is rock and A is
your brain.
>Figuring out this mapping does not change the
> physical activity of either A or B. You can argue that therefore the physical activity of A or B is irrelevant and consciousness
> is implemented non-corporeally by virtue of its existence as a Platonic object; or you can argue that this is clearly nonsense and
> consciousness is implemented as a result of some special physical property of a particular machine.
Why not as some special property of the algorithm (or the mapping)?
Brent Meeker
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Received on Thu Sep 14 2006 - 13:01:13 PDT