Re: Russell's book

From: Brent Meeker <>
Date: Tue, 12 Sep 2006 12:36:20 -0700

Johnathan Corgan wrote:
> David Nyman wrote:
> [re: QTI]
>>This has obvious
>>implications for retirement planning in general and avoidance of the
>>more egregious cul-de-sac situations. On the other hand, short of
>>outright lunacy vis-a-vis personal safety, it also seems to imply that
>>from the 1st-person pov we are likely to come through (albeit possibly
>>in less-than-perfect shape) even apparently minimally survivable
>>situations. This struck me particularly forcibly while watching the
>>9/11 re-runs on TV last night.
> It's the cul-de-sac situations that interest me. Are there truly any?
> Are there moments of consciousness which have no logically possible
> continuation (while remaining conscious?)
> It seems the canonical example is surviving a nearby nuclear detonation.
> One logical possibility is that all your constituent particles
> quantum-tunnel away from the blast in time.
> This would be of extremely low measure in absolute terms, but what about
> the proportion of continuations that contain you as a conscious entity?
> This also touches on a recent thread about "how being of low measure
> feels." If QTI is true, and I'm subject to a nuclear detonation, does it
> matter if my possible continuations are of such a low relative measure?
> Once I'm "in" them, would I feel any different and should I care?
> These questions may reduce to something like, "Is there a lower limit to
> the amplitude of the SWE?"
> If measure is infinitely divisible, then is there any natural scale to
> its absolute value?

I think it is not and there is a lower limit below which cross terms in the density
matrix must be strictly (not just FAPP) zero. The Planck scale provides a lower
bound on fundamental physical values. So it makes sense to me that treating
probability measures as a continuum is no more than a convenient approximation. But
I have no idea how to make that precise and testable.

Brent Meeker

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at
Received on Tue Sep 12 2006 - 15:37:25 PDT

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.3.0 : Fri Feb 16 2018 - 13:20:12 PST