Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent meeker writes:
>
> > >>>I think it goes against standard computationalism if you say that a conscious
> > >>>computation has some inherent structural property. Opponents of computationalism
> > >>>have used the absurdity of the conclusion that anything implements any conscious
> > >>>computation as evidence that there is something special and non-computational
> > >>>about the brain. Maybe they're right.
> > >>>
> > >>>Stathis Papaioannou
> > >>
> > >>Why not reject the idea that any computation implements every possible computation
> > >>(which seems absurd to me)? Then allow that only computations with some special
> > >>structure are conscious.
> > >
> > >
> > > It's possible, but once you start in that direction you can say that only computations
> > > implemented on this machine rather than that machine can be conscious. You need the
> > > hardware in order to specify structure, unless you can think of a God-given programming
> > > language against which candidate computations can be measured.
> >
> > I regard that as a feature - not a bug. :-)
> >
> > Disembodied computation doesn't quite seem absurd - but our empirical sample argues
> > for embodiment.
> >
> > Brent Meeker
>
> I don't have a clear idea in my mind of disembodied computation except in rather simple cases,
> like numbers and arithmetic. The number 5 exists as a Platonic ideal, and it can also be implemented
> so we can interact with it, as when there is a collection of 5 oranges, or 3 oranges and 2 apples,
> or 3 pairs of oranges and 2 triplets of apples, and so on, in infinite variety. The difficulty is that if we
> say that "3+2=5" as exemplified by 3 oranges and 2 apples is conscious, then should we also say
> that the pairs+triplets of fruit are also conscious?
No, they are only subroutines.
> If so, where do we draw the line?
At specific structures
> That is what I mean
> when I say that any computation can map onto any physical system. The physical structure and activity
> of computer A implementing program a may be completely different to that of computer B implementing
> program b, but program b may be an emulation of program a, which should make the two machines
> functionally equivalent and, under computationalism, equivalently conscious.
So ? If the functional equivalence doesn't depend on a
baroque-reinterpretation,
where is the problem ?
> Maybe this is wrong, eg.
> there is something special about the insulation in the wires of machine A, so that only A can be conscious.
> But that is no longer computationalism.
No. But what would force that conclusion on us ? Why can't
consciousness
attach to features more gneral than hardware, but less general than one
of your re-interpretations ?
> Stathis Papaioannou
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Received on Tue Sep 12 2006 - 08:22:48 PDT