> -----Original Message-----
Stathis Papaioannou
>
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
> > >>Why not? Can't we map bat conscious-computation to human conscious-
> computation;
> > >>since you suppose we can map any computation to any other. But,
> you're thinking,
> > >>since there a practical infinity of maps (even a countable infinity if
> you allow
> > >>one->many) there is no way to know which is the correct map. There is
> if you and the
> > >>bat share an environment.
> > >
> > >
> > > You're right that the correct mapping is the one in which you and the
> bat share the
> > > environment. That is what interaction with the environment does:
> forces us to choose
> > > one mapping out of all the possible ones, whether that involves
> talking to another person
> > > or using a computer. However, that doesn't mean I know everything
> about bats if I know
> > > everything about bat-computations. If it did, that would mean there
> was no difference
> > > between zombie bats and conscious bats, no difference between first
> person knowledge
> > > and third person or vicarious knowledge.
> > >
> > > Stathis Papaioannou
> >
> > I don't find either of those conclusions absurd. Computationalism is
> generally
> > thought to entail both of them. Bruno's theory that identifies
> knowledge with
> > provability is the only form of computationalism that seems to allow the
> distinction
> > in a fundamental way.
>
> The Turing test would seem to imply that if it behaves like a bat, it has
> the mental states of a
> bat, and maybe this is a good practical test, but I think we can keep
> computationalism/strong AI
> and allow that it might have different mental states and still behave the
> same. A person given
> an opiod drug still experiences pain, although less intensely, and would
> be easily able to fool the
> Turing tester into believing that he is experiecing the same pain as in
> the undrugged state. By
> extension, it is logically possible, though unlikely, that the subject may
> have no conscious experiences
> at all. The usual argument against this is that by the same reasoning we
> cannot be sure that our
> fellow humans are conscious. This is strictly true, but we have two
> reasons for assuming other
> people are conscious: they behave like we do and their brains are similar
> to ours. I don't think
> it would be unreasonable to wonder whether a digital computer that behaves
> like we do really
> has the same mental states as a human, while still believing that it is
> theoretically possible that a
> close enough analogue of a human brain would have the same mental states.
>
> Stathis Papaioannou
I am so glad to here this come onto the list, Stathis. Your argument is
logically equivalent....I took this argument (from the recent thread) over
to the JCS-ONLINE forum and threw it in there to see what would happen. As a
result I wrote a short paper ostensibly to dispose of the solipsism argument
once and for all by demonstrating empirical proof of the existence of
consciousness, (if not any particular details within it). In it is some of
the stuff from the thread...and acknowledgement to the list.
I expect it will be rejected as usual... regardless...it's encouraging to at
least see a little glimmer of hope that some of the old arguments that get
trotted out are getting a little frayed around the edges..
If anyone wants to see it they are welcome... just email me. Or perhaps I
could put it in the google forum somewhere... it can do that, can't it?....
BTW: The 'what it is like' of a Turing machine = what it is like to be a
tape and tape reader, regardless of what is on the tape. 'tape_reader_ness',
I assume... :-)
Regards,
Colin Hales
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Received on Mon Sep 11 2006 - 20:33:17 PDT