Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > > Le 05-sept.-06, à 15:38, 1Z a écrit :
> > >
> > > >
> > > >> The conscious computations, on the other hand, are there and
> > > >> self-aware
> > > >
> > > > Not really. They are just possibilities.
> > > >
> > > >> even though we cannot interact with them, just as all the statues in
> > > >> a block of marble would be conscious
> > > >> if statues were conscious and being embedded in marble did not render
> > > >> them unconscious.
> > > >
> > > > But that gets to the heart of the paradox. You are suggesting that
> > > > conscious
> > > > computations are still conscious even thought hey don't exst and
> > > > are mere possiiblities! That is surely a /reductio/ of one of your
> > > > premisses
> > >
> > >
> > > The everything-lister, with or without comp, takes as natural the idea
> > > that all possibilities exist, and that actuality is just a possibility
> > > viewed from that possibility.
> >
> > Of course it is not natural, or we would not
> > have two separate words for "possible" and "actual".
>
> Where does the idea that conscious computations might only be potentially
> conscious come from?
>From the ideas that:
1) A computation is only a particular computation (including
one of the subset that implement consc.) under an interpretation
2) Nothing gurantees that all possible interpretations will actually be
made
> If it isn't actually conscious, then it isn't a conscious
> computation.
If there is some meaning to being actually consicous other than
being acertain computation (and hence, being interpreted a certain
way) a contradicion ensues.
> It so happens that all the conscious beings of which we are
> aware in nature interact with their environment most of the time, but even
> if such interaction is necessary for consciousness, you could make the inputs
> part of a larger system, which is then inputless.
Is that supposed to stop it being a computation ?
> Stathis Papaioannou
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Received on Thu Sep 07 2006 - 05:41:19 PDT